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WHO IS AT THE TABLE?
INTERPRETING DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
FOR AD HOC GROUPS OF INSTITUTIONAL

INVESTORS UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF
BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE 2019
James M. Shea, Jr.*
This Note explores Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2019's
disclosure requirements when hedge funds and other institutional investors
appear as groups in Chapter 11 cases. In particular,this Note traces the
history of Rule 2019 and the various corporate reorganizationmechanisms
to explain the split between two bankruptcy courts on whether these groups
constitute "committees " under Rule 2019. This Note cites the fundamental
differences between these groups and protective committees-the
committees chargedwith representingsecurity holders underfederal equity
receiverships. Hence, ad hoc groups do not have to make detailed
disclosures of each individual transaction, disclosure that would be
required if the groups were considered "committees. " However, the
current industry practice insufficiently discloses the economic interests at
stake. This Note advocates renewed emphasis on individualfund holdings
and revision of Rule 2019 to require disclosure of positions at other areas
of the capitalstructure.
INTRODUCTION

When Adelphia Communications Corp. agreed to a sale of substantially
all of its assets to Time Warner Cable and Comcast Cable in 2005,1 it set
off a lengthy battle among a number of noteholder groups in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York: how would $17
billion be divided among thousands of creditors, each jockeying to secure
the largest piece of the pie? Adelphia and several hundred of its operating
and holding company subsidiaries filed for Chapter 11 protection under the

* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2004, Georgetown
University. I would like to thank my adviser, Professor Carl Felsenfeld, for his help. A
great thanks to Kenneth Eckstein, Amy Caton, and Jonathan Koevary of Kramer Levin
Naftalis & Frankel LLP for their thoughts and input, from the ideas stage through each of my
drafts. Finally, Iwould like to thank my family for their support and encouragement.
I. See In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 368 B.R. 140, 154 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), appeal
dismissed as moot, 371 BR. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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Bankruptcy Code in 2002.2 Adelphia was riddled with problems, both legal

and financial, following criminal misconduct on the part of its founders and
certain company insiders. 3 At last, the creditors, waiting for years, began to
see the light at the end of the tunnel following Adelphia's settlement with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of
Justice. 4 But to resolve the bankruptcy case-and receive payment on their
notes-the groups had to litigate a number of issues critical to the
confirmation of a plan of reorganization by July 31, 2006, or risk losing the
5
Time Warner and Comcast deals.
Given Adelphia's complex corporate structure, 6 its prepetition practices

of issuing subordinated unsecured notes from its subsidiaries, 7 and its
internal accounting practices, 8 holders of unsecured claims against some
subsidiary debtors stood to receive drastically different distributions under
any proposed plan. 9 Critical to the finalization of any plan was the

determination of certain issues related to interdebtor (and consequently
intercreditor) transactions.10

The groups that actively litigated these

intercreditor issues were the noteholders, primarily institutional investors
whose business involves the high-risk, high-reward practice of distressed

2. See Adelphia, 368 B.R. at 148-49.
3. See Debtors' Fourth Amended Disclosure Statement Pursuant to Section 1125 of the
Bankruptcy Code at 52, Adelphia, 368 B.R. 140 (No. 02-41729) [hereinafter Adelphia
Disclosure Statement]; Peter Grant, Adelphia, Regulators Near Accord; Cable Company
Could Pay $725 Million to Settle Case, Possibly EasingIts Sale, Wall St. J., Mar. 24, 2005,
at A3.
4. See Peter Grant & Deborah Solomon, Adelphia to Pay $715 Million in 3-Way
Settlement, Wall St. J., Apr. 26, 2005, at A3 (discussing Adelphia's agreement with the
federal government to resolve claims of looting and accounting fraud that led the company
into Chapter 11).
5. See Adelphia, 368 B.R. at 154; Adelphia Disclosure Statement, supra note 3, at 188;
see also Peter Grant, Adelphia 's Sale Plan Suffers a Blow: Major Creditor Group Vows to
Reject Proposed Payout, Saying It Favors Subsidiary, Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 2006, at C5
(discussing the risk to the Adelphia sale posed by noteholder group litigation).
6. See Adelphia, 368 B.R. at 146, 156 (confirming the reorganization plan for "230-odd
Debtors" described as a "rather complex parent-subsidiary structure").
7. See generally Adelphia, 368 B.R. at 156 (discussing the various noteholder
constituencies); Adelphia Disclosure Statement, supra note 3, at 67-72.
8. See Adelphia, 368 B.R. at 150-53 (discussing the "Bank of Adelphia paradigm" and
Adelphia's extensive restatement of its prepetition books).
9. See id. at 162 n.35 (noting the "significant detriment" that would occur to some
creditors depending on how certain intercreditor issues were resolved); Gregory Zuckerman
& Peter Grant, Adelphia Debt Stings Investors: Prices FallAmid Assets Dispute and Doubts
over Cable's Future in Face of Telecoms' Competition, Wall St. J., Dec. 23, 2005, at C1
(explaining how the uncertainty of Adelphia's bankruptcy led to depressed prices on the
company's debt in 2005).
10. See Adelphia, 368 B.R. at 152-53 & n.12 (describing the "waterfall" analysis
leading to the dispute over the accounting and legal implications of the company's book
restatements and noting that certain bondholder groups could be significantly affected by the
proposed resolutions to the intercreditor dispute); Zuckerman & Grant, supra note 9
(summarizing the intercompany claim dispute between parent company noteholders and
subsidiary noteholders).
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investing.' I Like other creditors, noteholders of Adelphia companies were
12
creditors of the individual companies that issued their notes.
Consequently, the noteholders organized themselves into groups to litigate
these issues, with holders of notes issued by the Adelphia parent company
banding together because of their similar interests and holders of notes
issued by the various subsidiary companies banding together into groups by
subsidiary issuer. 13 In order to efficiently and systematically resolve these
various intercreditor issues, the court approved the debtors' motion in aid of
confirmation, which established discovery and trial procedures for each of
14
the intercreditor issues.
The motion in aid proceedings began discovery in the fall of 2005 and
contemplated a series of six one-week trials on the various issues to be held
in February and March 2006.15 By the time the second trial had reached the
middle of March, it became clear that the motion in aid proceedings would
not be resolved before the July 31, 2006, deadline. 16 Eventually, the
companies' assets were sold and a plan was confirmed, 17 but only after the
noteholder groups, the creditors' committee, and the debtors reached a
18
settlement.
Adelphia's story illustrates the incredible power and influence that
security holders can have in modem Chapter 11 corporate
reorganizations. 19
For complex, public companies like Adelphia,
reorganization is a multibillion-dollar puzzle, and few unsecured creditors
or shareholders have the resources to vindicate their claims and interests
against bankrupt companies. Even institutional investors would be unable
to individually bear the costs of protecting their rights under the Bankruptcy

11. See Zuckerman & Grant, supra note 9; see also Adelphia, 368 B.R. at 156-57, 15961 (discussing the litigation and involvement of the ad hoc investor groups in the Adelphia
reorganization); Peter Grant, Adelphia Gains Some Ground in $17 Billion Reorganization,

Wall St. J., July 25, 2006, at B6.
12. See Adelphia, 368 B.R. at 156 (identifying noteholders' status as creditors).
13. See Zuckerman & Grant, supra note 9 (reporting on the litigation between
noteholders of the parent company and noteholders of its subsidiary, Arahova
Communications, over "how billions of dollars of claims are treated in Chapter 11 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code").
14. See Adelphia, 368 B.R. at 157-58 (confirming a Chapter 11 plan and discussing the
lengthy case history, including the motion in aid proceedings); Adelphia Disclosure
Statement, supra note 3, at 190.
15. See Adelphia, 368 B.R. at 161-62.

16. See id. at 162, 165 (discussing the length of the proceedings and the importance of
the sale closing before July 31, 2006); Grant, supra note 5.
17. The sale of most of the assets was accomplished pursuant to section 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code instead of through a plan of reorganization. See Adelphia, 368 B.R. at
169-70. However, Adelphia had to rush through a plan of reorganization for its joint
venture debtors to Comcast Cable, further delaying the motion in aid proceedings. Id. at 169.
18. See id. at 238-44.

19. See Grant, supra note 11 (reporting that noteholder litigation in Adelphia posed a
serious threat to the closing of sale transactions).
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Code. 20 However, when they pool their resources, hire a single law firm to
represent them, and speak with a collective voice, they can be successful in
maximizing
recoveries under a plan of reorganization by securing "a seat at
2
the table." '
Consequently, the appearance of so many ad hoc groups can make it
difficult to tell who is really at the negotiating table in a bankruptcy
reorganization. One major way that parties in bankruptcy and the court are
advised of the interests at play is through the filing of verified statements
made by counsel to ad hoc groups pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 2019. As David M. Friedman, counsel to the official committee
of unsecured creditors of Adelphia, has stated, "2019 is a provision that
requires public disclosure of what people hold for obvious reasons. It is
appropriate to know when somebody stands up in court, somebody takes a
position, somebody.., files pleadings, 22it's appropriate to know who their
clients are and what their positions are."
Increasingly, the people at the negotiating table in bankruptcy
reorganizations are distressed investors, including many sophisticated
24
institutional investors and hedge funds. 23 Alternately praised and vilified,
these distressed investors hold corporate securities, including debt and
equity securities, which offer high rates of interest outside of bankruptcy in
exchange for high risk. 25 Therefore, when an issuer files for bankruptcy,
these security holders band together to form ad hoc informal groups to
represent their similar interests in the issuer's bankruptcy. 26 Yet, these

20. See Kurt A. Mayr, Bankruptcy Rule 2019: To Disclose or Not to Disclose, That Is
the Question, Bankr. Strategist (ALM/Law Journal Newsletters, Phila., Pa.), Sept. 2007, at 1,
7.
21. See D. Tyler Nurnberg & Heath D. Rosenblat, Disclosure Rules Alter Chapter 11
Hedge Fund Strategies?,N.Y. L.J., Apr. 30, 2007, at 4; Mayr, supra note 20, at 7.
22. Transcript of Motions at 66, Adelphia, 368 B.R. 140 (No. 02-41729) [hereinafter
Adelphia, Sept. 11, 2006, Hearing Transcript]. Counsel to a group of noteholders, however,
argued that the group's Rule 2019 statement was both adequate and the same as everyone
else's: "I would also mention ...that we have done what each of the other litigants,
attorneys in this case have done in 2019s, and said that the debt was acquired at various
times.... [I]t's not a matter of a new group coming in that suddenly made acquisitions." Id.
at 125.
23. Marie Beaudette, Dry Spell in Bankruptcy Filings Is Expected to End in 2007: Risks
Rise for Homebuilders, Hospitals, Daily Bankr. Rev., Jan. 2, 2007, at 1, 9-10 (stating that
hedge fund creditors are already a "major presence in Chapter 11 cases" and that experts
predict hedge funds and other distressed investors, including private equity firms, will grow
in influence in corporate restructurings in the future); Numberg & Rosenblat, supra note 21
(describing the hedge fund tactic of investing at multiple layers of a company's capital
structure).
24. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
25. See infra Part I.B.2.b.ii; see also Peter Lattman & Karen Richardson, Hedge Funds
Play Hardball with Firms Filing Late Financials, Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 2006, at Al
(discussing the role of hedge funds as bondholders for certain debt issuances).
26. See Mayr, supra note 20, at 7 ("Distressed investors often form unofficial or ad hoc
committees/groups in connection with Chapter 11 cases. These informal arrangements
permit parties with similar interests to coordinate action and speak with one voice .... ).
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securities continue to trade during the bankruptcy case, and group

27
membership can, and frequently does, change.

When these distressed investors appear in bankruptcy cases as part of an

28
ad hoc group, their counsel will file the required Rule 2019 statement.

Since these statements disclose an attorney-client relationship between a
law firm and a number of client creditors or shareholders, Rule 2019
requires disclosure of the nature and amount of the clients' claims or equity
interests and the time of acquisition thereof.29 However, if the group
represented by that attorney is considered a "committee" under Rule 2019,
additional disclosures must be made-disclosures that point directly to the
30
buying and selling of securities, and the prices paid for those securities.
Complicating this distinction is that the groups often call themselves ad hoc
committees. 31 However, for hedge funds and some other institutional
investors, the distinction is critical because hedge funds go to great lengths

to keep their investment strategies a secret. As a result, ad hoc groups
disclose the group's aggregate holdings instead of each holder's relative
32
stake.
Recently, Judge Allan Gropper of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York in In re Northwest Airlines Corp. ordered a
group of equity holders to disclose their trading and investment history
under the more stringent standard of Rule 2019(a)(4), concluding that the
concerted efforts of the group of equity holders qualified them as a
committee under Rule 2019. 33 After the decision in Northwest,34 the
27. See Zuckerman & Grant, supra note 9 (discussing a decline in the price of one
Adelphia bond during 2005, which was probably attributable to the uncertainty of the
Adelphia outcome).
28. See Mayr, supra note 20, at 7 (noting that counsel to ad hoc committees voluntarily
file Rule 2019 statements "disclosing the existence of the group, its members' names and the
group's aggregate holdings").
29. Id.; see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019(a)(2). The time of acquisition that must be disclosed,
however, can be quite vague. See Adelphia, Sept. 11, 2006, Hearing Transcript, supra note
22, at 125 (noting that counsel stated that his disclosure that claims were acquired at various
times satisfied Rule 2019).
30. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019(a)(4) (requiring members of a committee other than an
official committee to disclose the time of acquisition of claims, the amounts paid for the
claims, and any buying or selling of claims); see also Marc Abrams et al., Intersection
Between Bankruptcy and Securities Law: Outline of Topics/Issues to be Addressed at 9th
Annual N.Y.C. Bankruptcy Conference by Panelists on Bankruptcy/Securities Law
Intersection § I.B.1 (2007). The distinction between committee disclosures and disclosures
for multiple creditors represented by a single attorney is not readily apparent in the rule and
has caused some confusion. See In re CF Holding Corp., 145 B.R. 124, 126-27 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1992) (stating that counsel "misread" the requirements of Rule 2019, confusing the
standards under Rules 2019(a)(2) and 2019(a)(4), which only applies to "the entity filing the
Rule 2019 statement").
31. See Mayr, supra note 20, at 7.
32. See Nurnberg & Rosenblat, supra note 21.
33. In re Northwest Airlines Corp. (Northwest 1), 363 B.R. 701, 702-04 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also In re Northwest Airlines Corp. (Northwest II), 363 BR. 704, 70708 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
34. The Northwest decision also spurred motions in several other bankruptcy cases,
namely, In re Le-Nature's, Inc., No. 06-25454 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2007), In re Musicland
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debtors in In re Scotia Development, LLC filed a similar motion seeking an
order compelling an ad hoc group of bondholders to comply strictly with
Rule 2019, but the motion was rejected by Judge Richard Schmidt of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas because the group
did not constitute a committee under Rule 2019. 35 Judge Schmidt expressly
rejected the Northwest decision and chose to follow what he called "a
practical approach" based on bankruptcy practices commonly followed in
36
large Chapter 11 cases.

Many in the distressed investing community are interested in the
resolution of this split. The participation of hedge funds in today's
bankruptcy cases places key bankruptcy interests, such as open and public
reorganization, in conflict with the secretive business models and practices
that make hedge funds successful business ventures. With many insolvency
experts predicting the next big wave of Chapter 11 filings, and so many
hedge funds entrenched in large holdings of corporate securities, figuring
out what disclosures must be made by investors appearing in bankruptcy

Holding Corp, No. 06-10064 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), and In re Dura Automotive Systems,
Inc., No. 06-11202 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007). However, these controversies were settled before
any decisions interpreting the application of Rule 2019 to ad hoc investor groups were made.
See Letter from Loan Syndications & Trading Ass'n and the Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass'n
to Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States 6 (Nov. 30, 2007) [hereinafter LSTA/SIFMA Comment
Letter], available at http://www.sifma.org/regulatory/pdf/BankruptcyRule2019Letter.pdf;
see also Motion to Compel Counsel for Certain 9% Subordinated Noteholders to Comply
with Bankruptcy Rule 2019 Disclosure Requirements, Dura Automotive, No. 06-11202
(Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 2, 2007); Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion by Wachovia
Bank, National Ass'n, for an Order Compelling the Informal Committee of Secured Trade
Vendors to File a Verified Statement Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019(A), Musicland,No.
06-10064 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2007); Motion of Wachovia Bank, National Ass'n for
Order Compelling Ad Hoc Committees to Fully Comply with Bankruptcy Rule 2019, LeNature's, No. 06-25454 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. May 9, 2007); Posting of Ben Feder to
Overhedged,
http://overhedged.blogspot.com/2007/11 /dura-automotive-seeks-disclosureunder.html (Nov. 6, 2007, 10:00 EST). Despite a formal objection from the subordinated
noteholders in Dura Automotive, the parties represented to the court that the matter was
settled, and shortly after the filing of the Rule 2019 motion, counsel to the noteholders filed a
detailed Rule 2019 statement, including the date of acquisition of, and price paid for, the
holders' notes. See Transcript of Motions on Shortened Notice Hearing at 4, Dura
Automotive, No. 06-11202 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 8, 2007) (withdrawing motion from hearing
when debtors' counsel stated that it was their "expectation that [the Rule 2019 motion]
should be resolved without the need for further intervention by the Court" because counsel to
the noteholders had agreed to file an amended Rule 2019 statement); Supplemental Verified
Statement of Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 2019 at ex. A, DuraAutomotive, No. 06-11202 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov.
7, 2007) (setting forth the "Name and Address," "Face Value of Bonds," "Dates of
Acquisition," "Amount Paid," and "Sale or Disposition" for each holder and his or her
bonds).
35. See Order Denying Scotia Pacific Co. LLC's Motion for an Order Compelling the
Ad Hoc Noteholder Group to Fully Comply with Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a) by Filing a
Complete & Proper Verified Statement Disclosing Its Membership and Their Interests at 2,
In re Scotia Dev., LLC, No. 07-20027 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2007).
36. Transcript of Motion Hearing at 4-5, Scotia, No. 07-20027 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr.
17, 2007) [hereinafter Scotia, Apr. 17, 2007, Hearing Transcript].
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cases is a critical question in Chapter 11 practice. 37 The Loan Syndications
and Trading Association (LSTA) and the Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association (SIFMA), the leading trade associations of distressed
investors, have predicted that distressed investors will no longer participate
in the bankruptcy process should the Northwest classification of ad hoc
groups as committees prevail. 38 Because very few cases have addressed
how Rule 2019 applies to ad hoc groups, the distressed investor community
is keenly interested in resolution of this problem. 39 In fact, LSTA and
SIFMA submitted a letter to the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of
Practice, Procedure, and Evidence seeking the repeal of Rule 2019, calling
it "obsolete" and arguing that it adversely affects the interests of key
40
participants in the Chapter 11 process.
Over the past century, corporate reorganization in the federal courts has
morphed from a general equitable principle into the complex and highly
structured Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings employed by companies like
37. See Henry T.C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the CorporateDuty to
Creditors, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1321, 1375 n.193 (2007) (highlighting the importance of the
"roaring controversy over [hedge fund] disclosure obligations under [Rule 2019]"); The
Vultures Take Wing, Economist, Mar. 31, 2007, at 77, 77 (noting the role that banks and
hedge funds plan to play in what many predict to be an active distressed and bankruptcy
market); cf Erika Lovley, How Troubled Firms Skip Bankruptcy Court, Wall St. J., Feb. 7,
2007, at B5B (describing the increasing role of hedge funds and distressed investors in outof-court restructurings, but noting that these out-of-court restructurings are the last chance to
avoid bankruptcy court); see also Henry T.C. Wu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt
Decouplingand Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 625, 73233 (2008) (describing how courts have disagreed on how Rule 2019 applies to distressed
"vulture" investors who "often accumulate large stakes in a debt class that are likely to be
pivotal in the expected restructuring"). Although Professors Wu and Black conclude that the
debate is not that controversial since, "[iun any case, creditors can avoid this rule in a number
of ways, including not serving on ad hoc committees and, oddly, gaining membership on an
official creditor committee," which are exempt from Rule 2019, id. at 733, these solutions
are not as easy as they sound. For one, the cost is sometimes too great for any single
security holder to take on the cause by itself. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, official committees are kept small to allow them to act as negotiating bodies.
See infra Part I.B.2. With only a handful of seats on an official committee, and a number of
different creditor groups in a complex reorganization, every creditor cannot get a seat at the
table by becoming a member of an official committee. In Adelphia, for instance, there were
approximately eight seats on the official committee of unsecured creditors, see Adelphia
Disclosure Statement, supra note 3, at 412, while there were at least sixty different classes of
creditors entitled to vote under the proposed plan. Id. at 2-4. Consequently, participation in
an ad hoc group remains the most viable way for many institutional investors to actively
appear in a Chapter 11 case.
38. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
39. Evan D. Flaschen & Kurt A. Mayr, Ad Hoc Committees and the Misuse of
Bankruptcy Rule 2019, 16 Norton J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 983, 983 (2007); John J. Rapisardi,
Information Disclosure by Distressed Claims Purchasers, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 15, 2007, at 3
(noting that a "dearth of case law regarding Rule 2019 exist[ed]" before Northwest and
Scotia, and that most cases that do address Rule 2019 "discuss[] the use of the Rule 2019 by
debtors to vet attorneys who purport to represent a large class of plaintiffs and bring a class
action claim against the debtor's estate"); 9 Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, Collier on
Bankruptcy 2019.04[4] (15th ed., rev. 2007) ("There is little case law dealing with the
requirements for compliance with Rule 2019(a).").
40. LSTA/SIFMA Comment Letter, supra note 34.
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Adelphia, Northwest Airlines, and Scotia Development. This Note explores
the various ways in which equitable principles and federal statutes have
governed reorganizations and the ways in which security holders have
participated in each of these different mechanisms. In particular, this Note
looks at a report issued by the SEC that laid the framework for Congress's
first significant foray into legislating a federal mechanism for corporate
reorganization during the 1930s and at the many changes that followed.
This report is the genesis for the predecessors to the modem Rule 2019, and
understanding the report is a crucial step in interpreting Rule 2019 today.
Part II of this Note discusses the recent Northwest and Scotia decisions
interpreting the application of disclosure rules to informal groups of
investors. In particular, Part II contrasts the "plain meaning" of Rule 2019
to require disclosure by committee members under Rule 2019(a)(4) in
Northwest with the "practical approach" requiring disclosure only from the
group's attorney in Scotia. Part II also discusses the positions advanced by
LSTA and SIFMA in calling for the revision of disclosure requirements
under Rule 2019.
After analyzing the conflict, Part III of this Note explains why ad hoc
groups of institutional investors are not committees under Rule 2019.
Judge Gropper's position is understandable in light of a plain meaning
reading of the rule. Yet, Rule 2019's use of the word "committee" has a
more specific meaning historically-and the meaning of "committee" in
place at the time of drafting is more appropriate. Nevertheless, disclosure
of some sort is required by the rule because the policy goals inherent in
Rule 2019 are necessary checks on abuse of the reorganization process.
Thus, Part III of this Note proposes a compromise that will ensure investor
participation while still achieving the necessary policy goals of open and
honest reorganizations and full disclosure of the true economic interests at
stake in reorganizations. Finally, given the current hedge fund practice of
holding multiple positions across a debtor's capital structure, Part III
suggests that Rule 2019 be revised to require disclosure of these crossstructure holdings in order to achieve the goal of revealing the true
economic interests at stake in reorganization.
I. FROM EQUITY TO STATUTE: A HISTORY OF INVESTOR PARTICIPATION IN
CORPORATE REORGANIZATION
Until recently, Rule 2019 acted mainly as a guideline for ad hoc groups.
They have filed statements that disclose some information about their
economic interests, but have not included all of the disclosures required in
Rule 2019. However, in 2007, courts began to develop more fully the ways
in which the rule applies to ad hoc investor groups. Rule 2019's history and
the various statutory and equitable processes under which it developed
influence the meaning of the word "committee." Part L.A begins with a
brief history of corporate reorganizations in federal courts over the past
hundred years. Specifically, Part L.A looks at a report of the SEC on
committee involvement in equity receivership and the resulting statutory
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changes Congress has enacted. In addition, Part L.A describes the shifts in
reorganization theory enacted as part of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. Part
I.B then describes the various ways in which committees and groups of
investors have participated in reorganizations in the various reorganization
processes. Finally, Part I.C describes the disclosure requirements of Rule
2019 and the limited jurisprudence interpreting the Rule.
A. Receiverships, the SEC, and Congress:
The Road to Modern Reorganizations
1. Federal Equity Receiverships
Corporate reorganization began in the federal courts under a system
known as equity receivership. 4' Reorganization, as a practical matter, was
unavailable under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which provided mainly for
the liquidation of legally insolvent corporations, defined as those companies
whose liabilities exceeded their assets. 42 No remedies were provided for
those companies that were equitably insolvent or "unable to pay their debts
43
as they mature[d]."

Absent a viable statutory procedure, federal courts, lawyers, and creditors
"made up the rules as they played the game, which they called the 'federal
equity receivership.' ' 44 First, a creditor from a state other than the debtor's
would file a bill in equity against the troubled company. 45 This out-of-state
creditor was then able to invoke federal jurisdiction by diversity, thus
removing the reorganization of debt from state courts. 46 The creditor would
41. See Daniel J. Bussel, Coalition-Building Through Bankruptcy Creditors'
Committees, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1547, 1552 (1996).
42. See id. at 1552. As Daniel J. Bussel notes, there were two possible ways to use the
bankruptcy process to effectuate a corporate reorganization: (1) sale of the bankrupt's assets
subject to a negotiated plan or (2) composition. See id. at 1552 n.13. However, these options
proved infeasible and impractical. Id.; see also Robert T.Swaine, Improvement of Judicial
Machineryfor the Administration of Insolvent Business Organizations, 39 Com. L.J. 154,
156 (1934) (noting that the only "practical escape which a corporation and its creditors [then
had] if its financial situation subject[ed] it to" the risk of local or state court receiverships
was to file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy or "to cause to be commenced against it what
ha[d] come to be called a 'consent receivership' proceeding in equity in a federal court").
43. Comment, Methods of Attacking Receiverships, 47 Yale L.J. 746, 746 (1938); see
also Bussel, supra note 41, at 1552-53.
44. Bussel, supra note 41, at 1552-53. Equity receiverships developed in the nineteenth
century out of the need for "some method.., to enable the newly built, but debt-laden,
railroads to carry on and yet to relieve them in their inability to meet their debts as they
matured." Arthur H. Dean, A Review of the Law of CorporateReorganizations, 26 Cornell L.
Q. 537, 537 (1941).
45. Dean, supra note 44, at 538 (noting the requirement that a foreign creditor have a
claim in excess of $3000); see also Bussel, supra note 41, at 1553-55 (detailing the eight
steps in equity receiverships).
46. See Bussel, supra note 41, at 1553; see also John Evarts Tracy, Corporate
Foreclosures, Receiverships and Reorganizations §§ 29-31 (1929) (arguing that federal
courts are the "preferable forum" for receivership suits, but that there is no federal question
involved in a corporate foreclosure, making diversity of citizenship the only available means

2570

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 76

seek the appointment of a receiver "of the debtor's liking" on the grounds
of the "debtor's equitable
insolvency," and the debtor would consent to the
47
receiver's appointment.
Under equity receiverships, a corporation's management or the
underwriter of a class of its securities would form protective committees for
each of the different public classes of securities. 4 8 These committees are
intimately involved with the reorganization and are responsible for
formulating plans of reorganization, which, after negotiations among the
49
various committees, would ultimately be approved by the court.
2. Section 77B
In 1934, Congress passed section 77B, 50 which was the first "statutory
reorganization process for non-railroad corporations."' 51 This section, in
essence, was a codification of the procedures of federal equity
receiverships. 52 Congress included certain provisions designed to ensure
that plans were fair and equitable, nondiscriminatory, and economically
feasible. 53 Section 77B also sought to protect investors by requiring greater
judicial scrutiny of protective committees.54
to obtain jurisdiction in the federal courts). As Tracy wrote, federal courts were preferable
because "federal judges are usually abler men, because they have had more experience,
particularly in equity matters, because their powers are broad and are generally exercised in
a broad manner," and because federal reported decisions provide a "wealth of precedent at
the command of counsel." Id. § 29.
47. See Bussel, supra note 41, at 1553.
48. See Tracy, supra note 46, § 10.
49. See Dean, supra note 44, at 538.
50. 48 Stat. 911, 911-25 (1934), amended by Chandler Act, 52 Stat. 840 (1938)
(repealed 1978).
51. Bussel, supra note 41, at 1555.
52. See id.; Dean, supra note 44, at 546 (describing section 77B as "largely a
codification of equity receivership procedure with particular attention to the more glaring
defects of that method").
53. See Bussel, supra note 41, at 1555; Dean, supra note 44, at 1555. Furthermore,
section 77B was adopted in reaction to dicta contained in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v.
Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913), in which the U.S. Supreme Court questioned, but did not decide,
whether the federal courts had jurisdiction to hear equity receiverships absent statutory
authority. See Bussel, supra note 41, at 1555 (discussing Boyd's holding as the genesis of the
absolute priority rule, which requires that dissenting creditors be afforded a fair opportunity
to participate in the reorganization if prereceivership shareholders received any distribution
in the receivership sale). By the late 1920s and early 1930s, several Supreme Court cases
seemed to cast doubt on the use of equity receiverships in the federal courts, suggesting
perhaps that the province of the federal courts could be limited to railroads and other public
utility company reorganizations. See First Nat'l Bank of Cincinnati v. Flershem, 290 U.S.
504, 515 n.7 (1934) ("All of the cases in which this Court appears to have exercised this
power in aid of reorganization . . .dealt with railroads or other public utilities where
continued operation ...seemed to be required in the public interest." (citations omitted));
Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U.S. 36, 52 (1928) ("We do not wish what we have said to be taken
as a general approval of the appointment of a receiver under the prayer of a bill brought by a
simple contract creditor simply because it is consented to at the time by a defendant
corporation.").
For competing views of the jurisdiction of federal courts in equity
receiverships following Boyd, see generally James N. Rosenberg, Reorganization-TheNext
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3. The SEC Report and the Chandler Act
In 1938, the statutory regime for corporate reorganizations changed
again. Congress passed the Chandler Act, creating Chapter X, following an
extensive eight-volume report by the SEC on "the strategy and techniques
of reorganization committees." 55 The SEC report was written under the
guidance of then-SEC Commissioner William 0. Douglas and addressed
the severe shortcomings in the corporate reorganization mechanisms then
available to struggling corporations. 56 It paved the way for the Chandler
Act in 1938, which allowed corporations a better process of reorganizing in
federal courts under the auspices of federal statutory law. 57 Part I.A.3.a
discusses the SEC report, the abuses it sought to eradicate, and Congress's
reaction in passing the 1938 Chandler Act.
a. The SEC Report on Protective and Reorganization Committees
Pursuant to its investigative powers authorized by the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC studied the work, activities, personnel and
functions of protective and reorganization committees. 58 The SEC report
strongly criticized then-existing means of reorganization-namely,
receivership, foreclosure, bankruptcy, and voluntary reorganizations-for
failing in practice to carry out their theoretical goals. 59 Reorganization,
was, theoretically, an integral part of corporate law because it allowed for
the systematic distribution of assets to creditors following business
failure. 60 In practice, though, these systems "conformed by and large to the

Step, 22 Colum. L. Rev. 14 (1922), and Robert T. Swaine, Reorganization-TheNext Step:
A Reply to Mr. James N. Rosenberg, 22 Colum. L. Rev. 121 (1922).
54. See Comment, Protective Committees and ReorganizationReform, 47 Yale L.J. 229,
232 (1937) ("[Section 77B] subject[ed] protective committees to judicial supervision after
their appearance in the proceeding as representatives of the investors who had been
); see also In re Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co.,
persuaded to accept their leadership ....
105 F.2d 358, 359 (3d Cir. 1939) (stating that under the system of equity receiverships,
unqualified and unrepresentative committees sought and obtained the right to represent
defenseless security holders while actually working in the interest of the debtor or other
adverse parties). Section 77B contained a provision whereby committees could intervene
only with permission of the court, while the debtor, the indenture trustees, and any creditor
or stockholder had the right to be heard in a proceeding. Id.
55. Dean, supra note 44, at 547; see also Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840
(1938) (repealed 1978)
56. See generally SEC, Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities,
Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees, Part I: Strategy and
Techniques of Protective and Reorganization Committees (1937); Dean, supra note 44, at
547; Richard W. Jennings, Mr. Justice Douglas: His Influence on Corporate and Securities
Regulation, 73 Yale L.J. 920, 934 (1964).
57. See Bussel, supra, note 41, at 1556-58; Dean, supra note 44, at 547.
58. See SEC, supra note 56; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73291, § 211, 48 Stat. 881, 909, repealedby Pub. L. No. 100-181, tit. 3, § 330, 101 Stat. 1249,
1259 (1987).
59. SEC, supra note 56, at 1.
60. Id. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) wrote,
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requirements and objectives of the reorganizers"--those parties in positions
of power, particularly management and the banks. 6 1 These groups took
control of reorganizations and used the process to their benefit and to the
detriment of investors. 62 For investors, reorganizations needed to be
"expeditious, economical, fair, and honest. '63 Reorganization fell short of
these ends because "[t]he systems of reorganization, the legal techniques,
the protective committee system, have all been shaped to conform with the
requirements of reorganizers. '64
Thus, these processes were
"incompatible" with investors' interests
and
"too often caused perversion of
65
the functions of reorganization."
Corporate insiders were not the only ones causing perversion of the
reorganization process. The SEC report pointed out that the "emolument[]
of control" was equally attractive to outside groups. 66 Because protective
committees were also able to use the reorganization process to take control

In theory, receivership and bankruptcy are the main mechanisms whereby creditors
are stayed and the assets of distressed companies impounded and protected for the
benefit of all investors. In theory, foreclosure is the machinery whereby secured
creditors realize upon their lien and thus protect themselves against those in
possession or those with junior claims. In theory, the statutory or charter
machinery for charter amendments, consolidations, mergers, or sales of assets
affords convenient methods for making desirable or necessary financial or business
changes.
Id.
61. Id. at 1, 4-5. The SEC was particularly concerned with how the theoretical goals of
reorganization were thwarted by practical concerns. Id. at 4 (noting that investors' interests
are dominant in theory, but are "compromise[d]" by the "practical considerations" of
reorganization).
For the SEC, control remained in the hands of the reorganizers.
"Reorganizers" were those groups in control of a reorganization; in equity receiverships, as
in section 77B reorganizations, that group was, by and large, a mix of management and
bankers. See id. at 863 ("Managements and bankers seek perpetuation of that control for the
business patronage it commands, which they may take for themselves or allot to others, as
they will.").
62. See Dean, supra note 44, at 547 (claiming that the reorganizations "were often
perverted and served the interests of the reorganizers in opposition to the interests of the
investors"). Thus, the reorganization process can best be described as "The Fight for
Control," SEC, supra note 56, at 863:
Managements and bankers ...seek... to perpetuate that control in order to stifle
careful scrutiny of the past history of the corporation. . . . [D]isclosure of the
incompetency or dishonesty of managements, which might interfere with their
continuance in control, is blocked. Control . . . leads to great detriment to
investors, for as a result costs mount, assets in the form of claims are lost, and
incompetent or faithless managements are restored to power.
Id.
63. SEC, supra note 56, at 863.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. ("The emolument[] of control... [is] no less desirable to groups on the outside
than they are to the management and bankers...."). The SEC lamented that "the
emoluments of control.., is not infrequently found in a reorganization supposedly devoted
to the necessary financial and managerial overhauling." Id.
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of the company, "the efforts of the parties [were] in the main spent in a
'67
fierce struggle for control."
i. Perceived Abuses in the SEC Report
The SEC report strongly criticized the workings of protective
committees, particularly those consisting of, or created by, company
insiders. 68 "By virtue of advance knowledge of the debtor's affairs and
practically exclusive possession of the indispensable bondholders lists"
these "hand-picked" insider protective committees could have considerable,
if not total, control over the reorganization process, 69 largely to the
detriment of individual security holders. 70 Equally troubling was the fact
that members of these insider committees also stood to gain financially
from their participation in reorganizations. 7 1 Such abuses prevented
companies from achieving the theoretical goals of reorganization and
needed to be eliminated.
Groups outside of the management's direction were also frequently a part
of the struggle for control of a reorganization, 72 often "able to win a variety
of victories and to make various profits," despite often being unsuccessful
in taking control of the company. 73 The SEC report recognized, though,
67. Id. However, often the success of protective committees in taking control of the
company depended on the "power, ability and prestige of those who presume to challenge
the existing management and bankers." Id. This fight for control remains, to some extent, a
very hot issue in modem corporate reorganizations. For an example of noteholders
challenging management, bankers, and one of the world's wealthiest men for control of a
multimillion-dollar steel company, and winning, see generally Order Confirming Consensual
Modified Plan of Reorganization, In re WCI Steel, Inc., No. 05-81439 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
Mar. 30, 2006).
68. See Comment, supra note 54, at 230.
69. Id.
70. See id. ("Uninformed and helpless, the great majority of security-holders generally
deposited their claims with such committees under agreements which bound depositors to
any plan their representatives might adopt ... ").
71. See id. at 231 (noting that the use of protective committees also offered reorganizers
"lucrative emoluments in the form of fees and patronage" and that this opportunity was
therefore a "powerful incentive for a protective committee sponsorship by inside as well as
other groups"); see also SEC, supra note 56, at 136 (detailing cases to provide "evidence of
how rich the spoils of reorganization may be"). Further, the SEC report noted that
"[b]ankers in control of the reorganization will be in a key position to obtain any
underwriting ....
[T]he history of reorganizations reveals that bankers controlling or in a
position of influence ... will commonly obtain those contracts if the plan provides for an
underwriting of the new securities." Id. at 137.
72. See id. at 671 (noting that committees seemed to appear in all types of
reorganizations, but were more prevalent in large corporate reorganizations because "the
reorganization [was] likely to attract more attention" since "the stakes [were] higher," but
noting that "size alone [was] not controlling" since "outside interests may be galvanized into
action where there has been gross mismanagement").
73. Id. at 672 (observing, once again, that outside groups may be able to get themselves
representation on the "dominant protective committees and reap the profits incident thereto"
or "win representation on the board of directors of the reorganized company"). Management
seemed to describe any outside group as "strikers," a term used to describe those "with no
status in the situation, either because they have no substantial financial interest at stake or
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that these disruptive outsiders challenging management and the banks for
control were actual security holders, 74 and even security holders posed a
threat to successful reorganization. 75 At the same time, though, despite the
significant challenges faced by outside groups in dealing with management,
the results of a
outside group participation could vastly improve
76
reorganization from a security holder's perspective.
In the reorganization of R. Hoe & Co., for example, an independent
77
group developed consisting of security holders and their representatives.
While counsel to the independent group of security holders had taken
aggressive tactics in the reorganization, some of which were seen as
distasteful and disparaging, 78 the SEC report nonetheless recognized that
counsel to the independent group "had a direct financial interest in Hoe
which he was protecting and also represented other persons who were
Although criticizing his
financially interested in the company." 79
"objectives and tactics" of using "direct, forceful and. . . 'vituperative"'

because they are motivated solely by the desire for personal profit." Id. at 673. The term
often "connote[d] a species of blackmail." Id. The SEC expressed concern that dominant
groups may simply pay off outsiders since they usually hold the outsiders in such low
esteem. Id. at 675. Nevertheless, the SEC pointed out that "there is also no doubt.., that
insiders sometimes seek to buy off a bona fide opposition group which is seeking not merely
its own profit, but benefit to the class of security holders which it represents." Id. In the
Baldwin Locomotive Works reorganization, for instance, noted in the SEC report, the
independent bondholder committee had a serious interest in the reorganization, it consisted
almost exclusively of security holders. Id. at 677. Often, management would try to "test the
integrity of the opposition" by putting out certain "feelers" to determine the motives of the
independent committee. Id. at 676. In the Baldwin Locomotive Works reorganization, this
took the form of the inside protective committee making an offer to pay a commission to the
independent committee if it sold some of the company's real estate in order to raise new
capital. Id. at 677. The chairman of the independent committee acknowledged that this offer
was an attempt by the inside committee to find out "whether I was the type of fellow that
would take a price." Id. The SEC report concluded that the "attitude of regarding all
outsiders as 'strikers' is serious. It tends to make opposition onerous, distasteful, and, even
in the most necessitous situations, somewhat disgraceful in the eyes of a large segment of the
public." Id. at 678.
74. See id. at 677 (citing the reorganization of Baldwin Locomotive Works and its
outside committee consisting almost exclusively of security holders).
75. Id. at 797-98.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 678.
78. See id. at 679 (mentioning that counsel to the independent committee had made a
"disparaging" motion to disqualify counsel to the receiver on the grounds that their
representation of the receiver was in conflict with their former representation of the
corporation). Interestingly, a similar motion was made by counsel to the Arahova
noteholders in In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 336 B.R. 610, 654 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 342 B.R. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (denying noteholders' motion to disqualify debtors'
counsel because it was "a tactical measure, to secure greater recoveries").
79. SEC, supra note 56, at 679-80 (footnote omitted) (reporting that the committee
represented people holding over ten percent of the issuance of notes and holders of about
2700 shares of class A stock).
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language in attacking the dominant groups, 80 the SEC noted that his actions
substantially benefited the security holders. 8 1
In the reorganization of Union Power Corp., 82 threats to institute fraud
proceedings against several underwriters of the bonds helped give the
outsiders enough power to block management control of the reorganization
process. 83 The SEC concluded that the outsiders' presence in the case was
the main reason security holders were able to recover in the reorganization
because an inside committee would have been unlikely to threaten fraud
84
proceedings against inside directors.
Even the independent committee in R. Hoe & Co.'s reorganization was
lauded by the SEC report because the committee was able to "wrest control
of the company from the bankers" by making "vigorous attack[s]" upon
banker management. 85 Further, they became very active in negotiating the
plan of reorganization and in "securing changes which they believed to be
'86
in the interests of security holders."
Simultaneously, the SEC confronted the difficulty of appraising the value
added to reorganizations by independent committees, primarily because
most outside committees were unsuccessful in wrestling control away from
management. 87 Even if an outside committee achieved some level of
success, the desire to profit from reorganization, rather than to achieve a
88
successful reorganization, may have motivated the committee.

80. Id. at 680.
81. Id. at 680-81 ("[F]rom the point of view of the interests of Hoe security holders,
charges that [he] was not properly qualified to appear in the reorganization, and attacks upon
his program by the inside group, were hardly tenable."). The SEC report also points out that
the formation of the independent bondholder committee of Union Power Corp. was shown
"to have been bonafide and to have proceeded from the desire of a security holder to protect
his interests." Id. at 681-82. The SEC, however, notes that the committee took "vigorous
action," id. at 682, but that these actions were "an example of the benefits that can flow to
security holders from the activities of outsiders," id. at 798.
82. For a discussion of the formation of the Union Power bondholder committee, see
SEC, supra note 56, at 681-83, and supra note 81.
83. See SEC, supra note 56, at 798-803.
84. Id. at 802-03 ("[Ihf it had not been for the appearance of this independent committee
on the scene, the bondholders would not have received either the recognition worked out for
them or its equivalent. . . . [E]ven if the insiders had formed a committee, it seems
reasonable to suppose that this would not have improved the bondholders' lot. It is hardly
conceivable that a protective committee organized or controlled by the insiders would have
favored assertion of a claim founded upon the alleged misconduct of its sponsors.").
85. Id. at 803, 805. The committee was eventually able to secure appointment of five
members to the corporation's board of directors, in the face of what the SEC described as
"great obstacles." Id. at 805-06.
86. Id. at 808 (noting, however, that the district court refused the independent
committee's request for allowance of fees and expenses from the estate because the judge
could not see "that anything ha[d] been brought into the estate as a result of [their] efforts, or
that the reorganization ha[d] been materially aided or advanced by what [they had] done"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
87. See id. at 809 ("At times the results of an independent group's activities are difficult
to appraise. Frequently, the group is entirely unsuccessful.").
88. Id. at 809. The SEC wrote,

2576

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

Consequently, the SEC hesitated to encourage unfettered outside group
participation in reorganizations so as not to encourage the very kind of
abuse of reorganization it sought to eradicate.
ii. Fundamental Policies of Reform
The SEC report concluded that its "survey supplies ample evidence of the
necessity of refashioning the process of reorganization to the end that
89
primary emphasis be given to the protection of the interests of investors."
The SEC identified three essential policies and fourteen suggestions to
effectuate these policies.
Primarily, the SEC encouraged placing control of reorganizations with
"bona fide security holders and their direct representatives." 90 To do this,
holders of securities had to be given the right to be heard on all matters and
to be active participants in the formulation of reorganization plans. 9 1 In
particular, independent groups of security holders, outside the control of
management, should be encouraged to take part in reorganizations because
they were the parties whose interests were directly at stake. 92 However, the
SEC was concerned that some groups would try to take advantage of the
reorganization process by buying securities at distressed and default
prices. 9 3 Consequently, any reform that would encourage bona fide
security holder participation had to provide some sort of check on these
94
distressed investors.
Second, because the SEC was concerned with protective committees
whose organizers and members sought to use reorganization to make a
profit, the SEC concluded that "renewed emphasis [must] be given to the
But frequently the outside group will pool its forces with the insiders before or
after formulation of the final plan of reorganization. This alliance of two warring
forces may be variously motivated....
... What appears to be a desertion of announced principles for an ostensibly
profitable settlement may be merely a wise move, prudently shaped to meet
practical exigencies. Conversely, what appears to be a victory for security holders,
may be merely a battle in which the entrepreneurs of the independent group carry
off the spoils.... [W]hat appears to be a search for the dollar may be a genuine
endeavor to perform a necessary service.
Id.
89. Id. at 897.
90. Id.
91. Id. ("The right to be heard in all matters arising in a reorganization proceeding, and
the privilege of submitting plans and suggestions for plans should be freely accorded
them.").
92. Id. ("[lindependent groups who represent bonafide interests should be encouraged"
because "[it is their investment which is at stake in any reorganization."). The SEC also
noted that participation should be denied to those "whose sole claim is derived from a
position in the management of the corporation or from banking associations with it." Id.
93. Id. ("[M]easures should be adopted to deal with those who acquire securities or
claims at default prices and either capitalize on their nuisance position or endeavor to
effectuate settlements or plans favorable to those who bought at depressed prices but
disadvantageous to those who purchased at pre-default prices.").
94. Id.
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fact that representatives of security holders in reorganization occupy a
fiduciary position." 9 5 Committee members (and their lawyers) ought not to
'96
possess "dual or multiple interests.
Finally, the SEC noted that it was essential that the abuses "which have
characterized the strategy and techniques of reorganization should be
eliminated. '9 7 In particular, the SEC noted that the use of deposit
agreements should be prohibited, 98 control of the essential bondholder lists
must be taken
away from management and bankers, 99 and
''misrepresentation and non-disclosure in solicitation methods must be
controlled."1 00
iii. Fundamental Methods of Reform' 0 '
First, the SEC recommended that independent, disinterested trustees
should be appointed to administer insolvent estates. 102 The SEC suggested
that the trustee would act as a "clearing house" for proposed plans, which
would "result [in] (or greater opportunity will be provided for) a larger
measure of participation in these activities by bona fide creditors and
03
stockholders."'
The SEC also recommended that "[t]he right of bona fide creditors or
stockholders to be heard on all matters arising in a reorganization
proceeding should not be restricted."' 1 4 Further, indenture trustees should
be given the power to "be heard on all matters, to file proofs of claim (but
not to vote) on behalf of holders of securities outstanding under the
10 5
indentures."
The SEC also proposed prohibiting compensation or reimbursement of
expenses for those "who have purchased or sold securities in contemplation
or after commencement of the proceedings."' 10 6 However, the SEC did not
limit checks against distressed investors to the denial of fees. The SEC
advocated preventing investors who acquired securities at distressed prices

95. Id.
96. Id.

Similarly, committees and counsel should not solely determine their own fees.

97. Id.
98. Id.

For a discussion of proxy deposit agreements, see infra notes 133-40 and

Id.
accompanying text.
99. Id. at 897-98.
100. Id. at 898.
101. The SEC report identified fourteen methods of reforming reorganizations in the
federal courts. This section discusses only those reform proposals addressing creditor and
equity holder involvement in reorganization proceedings. For a full discussion of the SEC
report recommendations, see SEC, supra note 56, at 897-907.
102. Id. at 899.
103. Id. at 899-900.
104. Id. at 901.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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from voting on plans at all. 10 7 In the opinion of the SEC,
such a practice
08
amounted to bad faith participation in reorganizations. 1
These policies were to be enacted and enforced through disclosures in
reorganization cases. The SEC recommended requiring any person who
represented more than twelve creditors or stockholders to file a sworn
statement setting forth the amount of securities or claims he owned, the date
he acquired them, the amount he paid, and any sale or dispositions he
made. 109 This rule was to apply to any person acting in a representative
capacity, including committee members and indenture trustees. 10° The SEC
also advocated requiring similar disclosures by attorneys with respect to
their clients' holdings."1l
Such disclosure would allow for "a routine
method of advising the court and all parties in interest of '' the actual
economic interest of all persons participating in the proceedings. 12
b. Provisionsof the Chandler Act
Congress enacted many of the SEC's recommendations through the 1938
Chandler Act. The Chandler Act allowed public corporations to reorganize
under the new Chapter X. 113 Congress implemented many of the SEC's
suggestions, creating a process in which insider control was prevented by
mandatory appointment of disinterested trustees and the involvement of the
114
SEC in reviewing all reorganization plans.
Similarly, the Chandler Act largely codified the disclosure requirements
advocated by the SEC report.' '5 A party purporting to represent others that
107. Id. at 902 (arguing that the "court should be empowered to provide that a claim or
share of stock ... should not be included within the class of those entitled to accept a plan, if
the acceptance of or the failure to accept any plan is not in good faith").
108. Id. ("The exercise of this power would make it possible for the court to prevent
racketeering groups from seizing control of the proceedings by purchasing the securities at
depressed prices and acquiring a strategic or nuisance position.").
109. Id. at 902.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Bussel, supra note 41, at 1557; see also Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 75-696, ch.
X, 52 Stat. 840, 905 (1938) (repealed 1978).
There was an alternative form of
reorganization under the Chandler Act, Chapter XI, which was designed for small businesses
and allowed for the restructuring of unsecured debts under a plan of arrangement, but did not
allow for restructuring of secured debt or equity interests. Id. at 1558. The different options
for reorganization under the Chandler Act, and abuses of the choices, eventually led
Congress to reject a dual system in favor of one reorganization chapter. See H.R. Rep. No.
95-595, at 223 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6182-83.
114. Bussel, supra note 41, at 1557.
115. Chandler Act § 211, 52 Stat. 840, 895 (repealed 1978) ("Every person or committee,
representing more than twelve creditors or stockholders, and every indenture trustee, who
appears in the proceeding" must file a "statement, under oath."). The statement was to
include "a copy of the instrument, if any, whereby such person, committee, or indenture
trustee is empowered to act on behalf of creditors or stockholders," id. § 211 (1), and "in the
case of a committee, the name or names of the person or persons at whose instance, directly
or indirectly, such employment was arranged or the committee was organized or formed or
agreed to act," id. § 211(2). The statements also were to include "a showing of the claims or
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failed to make adequate disclosures would be denied the right to be heard
until it complied with disclosure rules. 116 Chapter X thus provided for the
protection of public investors, the main suggestion of the SEC report, by
giving courts greater control over reorganization cases." 17
4. Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code
In 1978, Congress dramatically altered the federal laws of reorganization,
enacting the Bankruptcy Code and specifically Chapter 11.118 In enacting
Chapter 11 reorganization, Congress recognized the severe shortcomings of
the previous bankruptcy system, particularly the lack of protection of public
investors.1 19 The enactment of the Bankruptcy Code represented a
fundamental shift in the nation's approach towards business reorganization.
The House Report accompanying the Bankruptcy Code underscored this
realignment, noting that the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act "were written
in the 1930[s], at a time when the law of commercial reorganization was
little developed."' 120 In contrast, the House of Representatives noted that
stock represented by such person or committee and the respective amounts thereof.., with a
showing of the times of acquisition thereof." Id. § 211(4). Alternatively, the statement could
aver "that each holder of such claims or stock acquired them at least one year before the
filing of the petition." Id. Section 213 further provided that "an agent, indenture trustee, or
committee, purporting to represent creditors or stockholders, shall not be heard or allowed to
intervene in a proceeding... until such person or persons shall have satisfied the court that
they have complied with all applicable laws regulating the activities and personnel of such
persons." Id. § 213. Furthermore, judges were given the ability to "examine and disregard
any provision of a deposit agreement, proxy, power or warrant of attorney . . . or other
authorization, by the terms of which an agent, attorney, indenture trustee, or committee
purports to represent any creditor or stockholder." Id. § 212. Chapter X Rule 10-211,
enacted in 1973, contained provisions similar to those under the current Bankruptcy Rule
2019. Compare Fed. R. Bankr. P. 10-211 (1973) (repealed 1978), with Fed. R. Bankr. P.
2019; see also Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 5, 31 (1995) ("Bankruptcy procedure was governed in
substantial part by many sections of the 1898 Act ....
In 1964, Congress authorized the
promulgation of rules of bankruptcy procedure by the Supreme Court.... The rules
superseded inconsistent statutory provisions, which was quite important under the Act, given
its detailed procedural provisions. Today the situation is reversed; rules cannot supersede a
statute.").
116. Chandler Act § 213.
117. See Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of N.Y., 406 U.S. 416, 422 (1972);
SEC v. Am. Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 604 (1965) (Chapter X allowed "greater
protection to creditors and stockholders by providing greater judicial control over the entire
proceedings.").
118. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, ch. 11, 92 Stat. 2549,
2625-44 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. ch. 11 (2000)).
119. S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5796
("Reorganization, in its fundamental aspects, involves the thankless task of determining who
should share the losses incurred by an unsuccessful business and how the values of the estate
should be apportioned among creditors and stockholders. In a large public company, whose
interests are diverse and complex, the most vulnerable today are public investors who own
subordinated debt or equity securities. The bill, like Chapter X, is designed to counteract the
natural tendency of a debtor in distress to pacify large creditors, with whom the debtor would
expect to do business, at the expense of small and scattered public investors.").
120. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 5 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5966.
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"[c]ommercial financing ha[d] undergone significant changes since the
nearly universal adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in the 1960's.
The Bankruptcy Act ha[d] not yet been revised to account for the change in
the industry." 12 ' Thus, the Bankruptcy Code was designed to "modernize[]
bankruptcy law in its interaction with commercial financing."' 122 In
essence, the Bankruptcy Code reflected Congress's 12attempt
to fashion a
3
practical system reflective of actual market dynamics.
Unlike reorganizations under the Bankruptcy Act, 124 Chapter 11 debtors
largely remain in control of their affairs. 125 Chapter 11 also expanded the
debtor's administrative powers 126 and gave the debtor an exclusive period
in which to file a proposed plan of reorganization and to solicit acceptance
or rejection of such a plan. 127 Such an arrangement reflects Congress's
desire that a reorganization embrace an additional purpose-the
rehabilitation of debtors-which provides economic benefits to multiple
constituencies.

128

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 3-4, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5964-65 (recounting that the
Bankruptcy Act was "designed in 1898, in the horse and buggy era of consumer and
commercial credit, and was last overhauled in 1938," and setting forth the market
developments since then that had caused the bankruptcy system to "fall[] into disrepair").
124. See supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC's
recommendations for shifting control of reorganization from management and bankers to an
independent trustee).
125. See Elizabeth Warren, Business Bankruptcy 17-19 (1993) (opining that control by
debtors maximizes the value of a business because the debtor possesses superior information
on its operation); Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization
Remain a Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-first Century?, 78 Am.
Bankr. L.J. 153, 176 (2004) (concluding that the most significant aspects of Chapter 11 were
that "the debtor's management remained in control during the restructuring process" and that
"[t]rustees and examiners were only to be appointed for cause, and receivers were
prohibited"). Absent cause for the appointment of a trustee or examiner, debtors in Chapter
11 act as debtors in possession. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2000). A debtor in possession is
given virtually the same rights and responsibilities as a trustee and thus acts as a fiduciary of
the estate. See id. § 323(a) ("The trustee in a case under this title is the representative of the
estate."). In the case of a debtor in possession, the debtor in possession in Chapter 11 has
"all the rights.., and powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties.., of a trustee
serving in a case under" Chapter 11. Id. § 1107(a).
126. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 361-366.
127. Id.§ 1121.
128. H.R. Rep. No. 95-585, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179
(identifying benefits to employees, creditors, and stockholders that are "more economically
efficient" because reorganization "preserves jobs and assets"). Control by debtors, as
opposed to uninformed trustees, was thought to maximize the going concern value of
businesses, thereby increasing recoveries for investors. See id. at 220, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6179-80 ("The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are
used for production in the industry for which they were designed are more valuable than
those same assets sold for scrap."); Warren, supra note 125, at 8 ("The Chapter 11
reorganization alternative .. . attempt[s] to capture the going-concern value of a business
that would likely be lost in liquidation and to pass that benefit on to those who would be
injured by a business collapse.").
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However, Congress attempted to "balance the interests of all parties
involved in the Chapter II reorganization" by providing various safeguards
for the protection of creditor and public investor interests. 12 9 Importantly,
protection of public investors was even more crucial because the securities
held by the public were different-when the Chandler Act was passed,
public securities were typically senior bonds and companies were largely
privately held corporations. 130 By the 1970s, when the Bankruptcy Code
was enacted, public classes of securities were often subordinated debentures
and equity securities-the claims and interests at the lowest priority of
Chapter X's repayment scheme. 13 1 To provide more for recovery by public
investors, Chapter 11 had to focus on both rehabilitation of debtors and
repayment of creditors and shareholders. Consequently, the Bankruptcy
Code reflects a preference for the protection of a distinct set of economic
interests-namely, the interests of subordinated debenture holders and
equity holders. 132 Such a preference is evident when exploring the various
ways in which security holders and committees have participated in
reorganizations in the past.
B. Committees and Groups: Investor Involvement
in CorporateReorganization
Under each of the corporate reorganization mechanisms discussed,
committees of creditors and equity security holders have played vital roles
in reorganizing the companies. Under each system, the duties and roles of
committees have varied, but in essence the main purpose of committees has
been the same: committees represent creditors in either leading or assisting
in the development of a plan of reorganization that rehabilitates the
corporation and pays the outstanding debts of the corporation.
To
understand the role of committees, Part I.B explores the functions, duties,
and roles of committees under the various reorganization mechanisms
available in the last hundred years.

129. See Miller & Waisman, supra note 125, at 177 (pointing to adequate protection
rights for secured creditors, requirements that reorganization plans be accompanied by a
disclosure statement approved by the court, and due process for creditors in the form of
notice and hearing before obtaining entry of orders and judgments).
130. H.R. Rep. No. 95-585, at 222, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6181.
131. See id.
132. In fact, the policies of the SEC report were expressly approved in the drafting of the
Bankruptcy Code, as the protection of investors remained a paramount policy goal of the
new bankruptcy scheme. See Comm'n on the Bankr. Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc.
No. 93-137, pt. I, at 237-48 (1973), reprintedin H.R. Rep. No. 95-595 app. I, at 254 (1977),
reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6213 ("The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws is
of the opinion that the conclusions and recommendations of the protective committee study
and the Congressional policy embodied in the Chandler Act are still valid.").
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1. The Protective Committee in Receiverships and Chapter X
Under equity receiverships, "protective" committees "representing each
class of public debt would form."' 13 3 Usually, these committees were
organized by company management or the security underwriters and were
intimately involved in the reorganization. 134 Protective committees did not
have standing to appear on their own.135 However, courts would grant them
permission to intervene in a reorganization. 136 Protective committees then
began soliciting irrevocable proxies for the securities, or sometimes even
the securities themselves, of the class the committee purported to
represent. 137 Through these proxies or security deposits, the various
protective committees then had the power to negotiate plans on behalf of
their constituencies to reorganize the corporation, producing a plan
negotiated by all of the various classes of debt and equity. 138 In essence,
"the bondholders irrevocably agree[d] to be bound thereby by depositing
their bonds" and thus ceded power to the committee to perform its
"principal work of the committee under the deposit agreement"formulation of a plan of reorganization. 139 In exchange, the duties of the
140
committee were "in the highest degree fiduciary."'
133. Bussel, supra note 41, at 1553. These committees often consisted of large holders of
the security, but also often included "men of experience and prestige so that their names
[would] serve to create confidence in the committee." Chester Rohrlich, Protective
Committees, 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 670, 675 (1932). Traditionally, "[t]he banking house which
sold the bonds to the public [would] take the initial step by selecting certain men to act as a
committee." Churchill Rodgers, Rights and Duties of the Committee in Bondholders'
Reorganizations, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 899, 900 (1929); see also Tracy, supra note 46, § 10
(detailing steps for the formation of a protective committee, including initiation by
underwriting banks).
134. Dean, supra note 44, at 538; Rohrlich, supra note 133, at 675 (noting that the
protective committee was "self-constituted, willing itself into being.").
135. See Bussel, supra note 41, at 1558.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1553. These deposit agreements "would give the protective committee broad
discretion to negotiate a plan of arrangement that would modify the rights of the
securityholders it represented." 1d. Furthermore, these deposit agreements were standardized
form contracts. Bondholders exchanged their bonds for certificates of deposit, and they
agreed to appoint the committee to represent their interests. See Rodgers, supra note 133, at
900, 904.
138. Bussel, supra note 41, at 1553. In general, each class of debt was represented by a
different protective committee. See Tracy, supra note 46, § 18 (stating that "the negotiations
as to [a] plan should be carried on by separate committees, each representing a separate class
of security holders").
139. Rodgers, supra note 133, at 907. The various protective committees "would
negotiate with each other and the debtor management over a plan." Bussel, supra note 41, at
1553. Under the proposed plan, existing securities would be surrendered for new securities
that would be allocated among creditors and shareholders. Id. When a plan was agreed to, a
new reorganization committee would emerge, consisting of the protective committees and
debtor management. Id. The court would then set rules for a foreclosure sale of the debtor's
property, at which the reorganization committee would be the only bidder. Id. "[T]he
reorganization committee had the full cooperation of management and could use the
securities controlled by the protective committees to 'credit bid' for the firm's assets." Id. at
1553-54. Upon presentation to the court, the debtor's property would be sold to the
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Under section 77B and Chapter X, protective committees were given
broad opportunity to intervene in cases. 14 1 Although neither statute
conferred official standing on protective committees, Chapter X
"anticipated that committees would continue to form and represent creditors
in the proceeding." 1 42 Consequently, under both section 77B and14 Chapter
3
X, committees could request payment of their fees from the estate.
The two essential characteristics of protective committees under equity
receiverships (and carried over to section 77B and Chapter X
reorganizations 144 under subsequent federal statutes) were the
representation of individual security holders, and the fiduciary relationship
that extended to individual security holders. Protective committees were
14 5
required to be "reasonably representative" of security holders' interests.
In fact, one court noted the "well-settled principle that: [a] bondholders
and as such owes
(creditors) committee is a fiduciary for all bondholders
146
undivided loyalty and allegiance to the bondholders."'
Furthermore, protective committees "directly represented" security
of
holders and "act[ed] in their behalf' and therefore "must be free 147
conflicting interest . . . [and] give loyal and disinterested service."

holders when they did not
Committees thus represented individual security
14 8
appear formally in their individual capacities.
reorganization committee and nonconsenting creditors would receive their pro rata share in
cash in accordance with the priority of their legal rights. See id. at 1554. Some sixty years
following the height of equity receiverships, Professor Bussel called the process an "odd
little dance, a negotiated restructuring masquerading as a receivership and foreclosure." Id.
at 1555.
140. Rodgers, supra note 133, at 905.
141. See Bussel, supra note 41, at 1558.
142. Id.
143. See § 77B(c)(9), 48 Stat. 911, 917 (1934), amended by Chandler Act, 52 Stat. 840
(1938) (repealed 1978); Chandler Act § 242, 52 Stat. 840, 900 (1938) (repealed 1978).
144. See Bussel, supra note 41, at 1558 (discussing the carryover of the committee role
from equity receiverships into Chapter X).
145. Steere v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 98 F.2d 889, 892 (3d Cir. 1938) (discussing
the role of protective committees in reorganization proceedings in evaluating claims for
payment of attorneys' fees from debtor's estate).
146. In re Realty Assocs. Sec. Corp., 61 F.Supp. 574, 576 (E.D.N.Y.1945) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted) (denying the motion of certain bondholders to disqualify a
bondholder committee for breach of its fiduciary duties to the bondholders).
147. In re Int'l Ry. Co., 86 F. Supp. 546, 546-47 (W.D.N.Y. 1949) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Tracy, supra note 46, § 16 ("The duties of the committee
will be to represent the depositing bondholders in all matters requiring bondholders' action
and for all such purposes they are the owners of the bonds.").
148. See In re Flour Mills of Am., Inc., 27 F. Supp. 559, 561 (W.D. Mo. 1939)
(highlighting the fact that section 211 of the Chandler Act "assume[s] that creditors and
stockholders may be represented by committees, or groups of creditors and stockholders may
be represented by a person" while section 209 affords "any creditor or stockholder the right
to appear in person, by an attorney at law, by duly authorized agent, or by a committee").
The Chandler Act granted creditors and stockholders the right to be heard and the freedom to
decide how they wished to appear. See id. ("[E]very person [has] the right to be heard in a
way that he may select. The judge must hear him in his own proper person, or by an
attorney, or by an agent, or through a committee.... [I]t is not the function nor the power of
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2. Committees Under the Bankruptcy Code
Today, representation of security holders is divided between two
different types of groups-official committees and ad hoc groups. Unlike
protective committees, ad hoc groups are individual security holders
voluntarily appearing to enforce their rights rather than leaving
representation up to the official committees appointed pursuant to section
1102 of the Bankruptcy Code. Often, individual creditors find official
committee representation insufficient or wish to take more aggressive
positions than those advocated by official committees. Consequently, they
band together and form ad hoc groups. As a result, two different groups,
the official committees and the ad hoc informal groups, play active roles in
today's bankruptcy reorganizations.
a. Section 1102 Official Committees
The Bankruptcy Code contemplated the protection of creditor interests
through the formation of official committees. Section 1102 of the Code
called for the U.S. trustee 14 9 to appoint a committee of creditors holding
unsecured claims and delegated power to the U.S. trustee to appoint
additional committees of creditors or of equity security holders as the
trustee deemed appropriate.15 0 A committee appointed under section 1102
51
is required to act "in the interest of those represented."' '
i. Roles of the Official Committees
The official committees represent various classes of debt and committee
members and "are commonly thought of as representatives of all unsecured
creditors." 152 Section 1102 of the Code requires that the committee
structure contain "adequate representation of creditors. ' 153 As fiduciaries,
committee members have obligations to represent creditors through duties
54
of loyalty and care. 1
the court to direct or coerce creditors or stockholders to become articulate in the proceeding
only through representatives of groups .... ").
149. The U.S. trustee is appointed by the U.S. attorney general who may appear and be
heard in any matter in a bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 307 (2000); 28 U.S.C. §§ 581-589
(2000). The primary function of the U.S. trustee at the commencement of a case is to call a
meeting of creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 341. If the debtor has filed under Chapter 11, the U.S.
trustee appoints a committee of unsecured creditors of the debtor at this meeting. Id. § 1102.
150. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
151. Id. § 1103(c)(5).
152. Bussel, supra note 41, at 1560-61 (comparing protective committees with
Bankruptcy Code official committees, noting that the protective committee structure was
designed to "reduce[] the risk of insider abuse"); see 11 U.S.C. § 1 103(c)(5) (stating that the
committee appointed under section 1102 is required to act "in the interest of those
represented").
153. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2).
154. See Bussel, supra note 41, at 1562-66; Carren Shulman & Timothy Mehok,
Membership Has Its Privileges, or Does It?, Financier Worldwide (Heller Ehrman LLP,
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ii. Functions in the Chapter 11 Process
Official committees serve various functions in the reorganization process.
In particular, official committees may take part in the administration of a
case; 155 investigate causes of action against the debtor, its management, or
insiders of the corporation; 15 6 participate fully in the negotiation and
solicitation of plans of reorganization; 157 and generally monitor all
proceedings related to the bankruptcy case. The official committee is given
the statutory authority to "perform such other services as are in the interest
of those represented."1 58 In addition, the official committee is a "party in
interest" and "may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a
case."1 59 The committee is also entitled to service of process of any
motion, pleading, objection, or other paper filed with the court in the
60

case. 1

b. The Ad Hoc Informal Groups
Ad hoc informal groups form mainly from creditor frustration with the
committee process. Official committees represent every class of creditors
in an attempt to consolidate all creditor interests into one negotiating
body.161 Individual creditors, particularly hedge fund creditors looking to
control their own representation, wish to be heard individually, a right
afforded all creditors and equity security holders under the Bankruptcy
Code.162 Creditor unhappiness with the committee system may stem from
New York, N.Y.), n.d., at 1 (noting the fiduciary duty to maximize recoveries for the estate
and its creditors). Professor Bussel notes that the leading case on committees' fiduciary
obligations is Woods v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262 (1941). Bussel, supra
note 41, at 1562. Although this case arose in the context of the protective committee system,
at the time of Bussel's publication, Woods had been cited in 136 judicial opinions in
bankruptcy cases under the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 1562 n.55.
155. 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1).
156. Id. § 1103(c)(2).
157. Id. § 1103(c)(3) (stating that committees may "participate in the formulation of a
plan, advise those represented by such committee of such committee's determinations as to
any plan formulated, and collect and file with the court acceptances or rejections of a plan").
158. Id. § 1103(c)(5).
159. Id. § 1109(b).
160. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(i).
161. See Bussel, supra note 41, at 1560. This negotiating body needs to be consolidated
because, according to Professor Bussel, "[o]ne striking finding from the study of the history
of reorganization law ... is that, somehow, if we do place people in a room together and
make them discuss a problem, usually, but not always, bargains will be struck." Id. at 1609.
As a result, at least as far as official committees go, the overwhelming trend is to appoint a
single creditors' committee, regardless of the size of the debtor or its capital structure. Id.;
see also In re Hill Stores Co., 137 B.R. 4, 5-6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that the
bankruptcy court has discretion to appoint multiple official committees because sometimes a
case is "sufficiently large and complex" enough to overcome the general "reluctan[cel" to
appoint multiple committees, but declining to do so in the instant case).
162. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (granting every creditor and equity security holder the status of
"party in interest" and giving creditors, including bondholders, the right to raise any issue in
a case and to "appear and be heard on any issue in a case"); In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp.,
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the failure to appoint multiple creditor groups, as contemplated in the 1978
Bankruptcy Code, 163 which is rarely done. 164 To represent actively their
interests, similarly situated security holders band together and form ad hoc
groups (sometimes referred to colloquially as "ad hoc committees") to
165
appear in Chapter 11 cases.
In these cases, these ad hoc committees consist of institutional investors,
such as hedge funds and investment firms, whose businesses often involve
the buying and selling of distressed debt, which includes risky
noninvestment grade publicly traded debentures (known in the financial
industry as high yield or junk bonds) 166 and equity securities of bankruptcy
(or near-bankrupt) companies. 167 It is helpful to understand how these
markets work in order to see how holders of these debt securities end up as
players in Chapter 11 cases.

359 B.R. 54, 64 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("[T]he law has long upheld creditors' efforts to
maximize their individual recoveries in their self-interest as creditors under a plan.").
163. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 104 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6065 (noting that the Bankruptcy Code permits more than one committee in a case and that
creditor "committees" will be the primary "negotiating bodies for the classes of creditors that
they represent").
164. See Bussel, supra note 41, at 1574 & n. 112 (noting litigation over the structure of
committees, but admitting that such litigation may have been the result of "economic issues"
and not the "appointment process"). Nevertheless, it is often extremely difficult to construct
a committee that can adequately represent the different interests of various classes of
creditors. For a discussion of the challenges faced by the U.S. trustee in composing
creditors' committees in the Maxicare Health Plans, Inc., bankruptcy case of the late 1980s,
see id.
165. See Mayr, supra note 20, at 7 (discussing the creation of "informal arrangements" of
ad hoc groups); Shulman & Mehok, supra note 154, at 2 (citing the various reasons for the
formation of ad hoc groups, principally, "to remedy the official committee's failure to
adequately address the concerns of a particular group of creditors" and "to avoid the burden
of having fiduciary duties imposed by membership on an official committee"). The
appearance of ad hoc groups in bankruptcy can best be seen in the Adelphia
Communications Corp. bankruptcy case. See Adelphia, 359 B.R. at 56 (describing the
Adelphia reorganization as one in which "investors in distressed debt" were involved in a
protracted litigation represented by separate counsel). For a more detailed discussion of the
various developments in the Adelphia case, see generally In re Adelphia Communications
Corp., 368 B.R. 140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed as moot, 371 B.R. 660 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (confirming the Adelphia Chapter 11 plan, in which the official committee of
unsecured creditors consisted of approximately 7 members, despite representing almost 300
debtors' estates eventually valued at almost $18 billion).
166. See Edward I. Altman & Scott A. Nammacher, Investing in Junk Bonds 2-5 (Beard
Books 2003) (1987); Numberg & Rosenblat, supra note 21 (arguing that hedge funds "bring
liquidity to the market" and can "bring substantial value to the restructuring process because
they have the sophistication to formulate the right business plan and 'deep pockets' that
allow for additional investment if the 'right' business fix requires it"); Serena Ng, Junk
Turns Golden, But May Be Laced with Tinsel, Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 2007, at C1.
167. See, e.g., In re Northwest Airlines Corp. (Northwest 1), 363 B.R. 701, 702 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing the appearance of ad hoc group of equity security holders); see
also infra note 182.
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i. The Emergence of the Secondary Distressed Debt Market
Junk bonds have become a common means of financing for corporations.
High yield or junk bonds 16 8 are publicly traded debt obligations rated by
one of the independent agencies as noninvestment grade. 169 Debt of this
grade is highly speculative and consequently carries high risk and a
correspondingly high level of interest.170 Public debt, including these high
yield debt offerings, represents substantial portions of the unsecured debt of
a large secondary
most large corporate Chapter 11 debtors. 17 1 In addition,
72
market exists for these (and more traditional) debts.'
Historically, noninvestment grade debt had been limited to "fallen
angels," debt of investment grade that had, due to poor company
performance, been downgraded into the noninvestment grade ratings
categories. 173 However, with the rise of interest rates in the late 1970s,
traditional investments became much less attractive to investors, who
decided to switch to the rapidly expanding supply of high yield corporate
debt. 174 The high yield market offered investors an opportunity to achieve
superior yields, increased liquidity, and diversification potentials
unmatched in other markets. 175 For companies, high yield debt offers
the availability of credit that it would
significant advantages-principally,
176
otherwise be unable to secure.
168. As noted by Professor William A. Klein, "[T]echnically these debt instruments are
generally debentures rather than bonds-if we take bonds to mean secured obligations."
William A. Klein, High-Yield ("Junk") Bonds as Investments and as Financial Tools, 19
Cardozo L. Rev. 505, 505 (1997).
169. See Altman & Nammacher, supra note 166, at 1; Dan Raviv, Comic Wars: Marvel's
Battle for Survival 13-14 (Heroes Books 2004) (2002) (describing high yield securities as
"the great balancing act between risk and reward").
170. See Altman & Nammacher, supra note 166, at 1; Raviv, supra note 169, at 14 ("The
issuer of these bonds would never deny that they were risky, because the principal-the face
value-might never be repaid, but the high interest being offered was sufficiently seductive
to make up for the risk.").
171. See Edward Altman, Current Conditions in the Global Credit Markets 14 (2006),
available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/-ealtman/CurrentConditionsHYMarket.pdf (noting
that in 2005, twenty-nine public companies filed for Chapter 11 with aggregate liabilities of
$140.1 billion).
172. Id. at 16 (highlighting that in 2006, $39.9 billion of distressed debt was traded;
whereas, in 1991, the volume was only $4.4 billion); see also Raviv, supra note 169, at 14
(describing high yield bonds as "so popular that they were traded from one investor to the
next, in a 'secondary market' that added to the impression that they always had some
definable value," and further highlighting the fact that "[b]y the time the maturity date
[comes] around" the holders of high yield bonds are rarely the same people who initially
bought them).
173. See Altman & Nammacher, supra note 166, at 3-4 (describing the origins of the
term "junk" in the mid-1970s to define corporate securities that deteriorated in quality to
such an extent that "the default probability was considered sufficiently high so as to drop the
bonds from the list of investment grade securities").
174. See id. at 5.
175. Id.; Ng, supra note 166.
176. See generally Klein, supra note 168. However, companies sometimes favor issuing
debt over equity given its tax benefits. See Ng, supra note 166.
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Today, distressed debt often contains both the "fallen angels" and high
yield debt instruments. In either case, the term distressed debt refers to the
177
debt of a company once its operations become financially troubled.
While not exactly debt that is in default, distressed debt is debt viewed by
analysts as heading towards default, and consequently distressed securities
often trade at prices below their face value. 178 Holders of these debt
securities become involved in bankruptcy when the issuer files for Chapter
11 protection.
ii. Distressed Investors in Chapter 11 Proceedings
Within the context of bankruptcy reorganizations, distressed trading is
having significant impact on the reorganization process because the
liquidity of distressed securities-even after the issuer files for Chapter
179
l1-allows distressed investors entry into many Chapter 11 cases.
Investors holding debt securities generally rely on the principle that "a
claim or interest in the hands of a purchaser has the same rights and
180
disabilities as it did in the hands of the original claimant or shareholder."'
Thus, there is no disability attached to a claim (including a debt security)
purchased after the commencement of a case. Therefore, distressed traders
are appearing more and more frequently in Chapter 11 cases, a phenomenon
that has been both lauded as providing rehabilitation for distressed

177. See Paul M. Goldschmid, Note, More Phoenix Than Vulture: The Case for
Distressed Investor Presence in the Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 2005 Colum. Bus.
L. Rev. 191, 193 n.6 (noting that the term "distressed-debt investors. . . refers to a class of
investors who purchase the assets or claims of firms once their debt or operations become
'distressed"').
178. See Raviv, supra note 169, at 14 (detailing how "scavenger" market participants can
buy bonds at low prices). In 2006, public markets set a price for defaulted bonds (in the
aggregate) of $23.3 billion, compared to a face value of those bonds of $31.2 billion.
Edward I. Altman & Jeffrey Swanson, Special Report on the Investment Performance and
Market Size of Defaulted Bonds and Bank Loans: 2006 Review and 2007 Outlook 4 fig.l
(2007), available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/-ealtman/2006%201nvestPerf.pdf.
179. Miller & Waisman, supra note 125, at 181 ("Distressed debt trading and changing
relationships as a result of globalization and technology have upset the symbiotic
relationship of a debtor and its creditors. Traders purchase debt claims at a substantial
discount, as they are concerned solely with the return on their investment.").
180. Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control of
Corporationsin Chapter 11, 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 13 (1990); Mayr, supra note 20, at 7 ("It
is wcll settled that a Chapter 11 debtor cannot treat its similarly situated creditors differently
based upon the price that they paid for their claims."); see also In re Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 159
F.2d 630, 632 (3d Cir. 1946) ("In the absence of fraud, the prices which security holders pay
for their securities do not affect the measure of their participation under the plan of
reorganization." (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Fairfield Exec. Assocs., 161 BR.
595, 602-03 (D.N.J. 1993) (holding that a creditor's motivation for investing is irrelevant in
determining its classification); In re Executive Office Ctrs., Inc., 96 B.R. 642, 649 (Bankr.
E.D. La. 1988) (concluding that purchasers of bankruptcy claims at discounts succeed to the
rights of the sellers); Robert D. Drain & Elizabeth J. Schwartz, Are Bankruptcy Claims
Subject to the Federal Securities Laws?, 10 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 569, 576 (2002)
(describing the market for distressed debt, particularly trade debt, but noting the liquidity of
debentures and bonds).
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companies and criticized as a mechanism for achieving a high return on
investment. 181
Distressed investors participate in Chapter 11 reorganizations in several
ways, in both debt and equity positions. Hedge funds, in particular, often
invest in first- or second-lien secured debt and join lender groups;
frequently they invest in unsecured subordinated notes, bonds and other
debentures, and equity securities.' 8 2 Once issuers enter bankruptcy, hedge
funds play active roles-either in lender groups, or even on official
committees. 183 However, more frequently, these investors favor forming ad
hoc groups in an effort to "secure a seat at the table" with the debtors, its
lenders, and the official committees in the case without the stringent
184
fiduciary standards imposed upon members of official committees.
Increasingly, institutional investors are using bankruptcy to maximize
recoveries by holding positions across capital structures.1 85 In addition,
some investors are known to practice "short selling" across a corporation's
capital structure, which allows them to buy securities in another area of the
capital structure and sell them quickly to make a gain in a short amount of
time. 186 Throughout their involvement in Chapter 11 cases, institutional
181. Compare Miller & Waisman, supra note 125, at 181 ("Traders purchase debt claims
at a substantial discount, as they are concerned solely with the return on their investment.
Worse yet, traders may purchase debt in order to obtain control of the debtor and dominate
the administration of the reorganization case.... The sooner a trader or group of traders can
force a debtor out of Chapter 11, the sooner they can monetize the claim and obtain a return
on their speculation, without regard to any other factor, including whether or not the debtor
had been fully rehabilitated when it was pushed out of Chapter 11."), with Goldschmid,
supra note 177, at 193 ("[D]istressed-debt investors generally have a salutary impact on the
residual actor problem of bankruptcy by expediting business reorganizations and protecting
going-concern enterprise values.").
182. See Nurnberg & Rosenblat, supra note 21. Frequently, hedge funds hold more than
one position in an issuer's capital structure. Id.
183. See id.; see also Goldschmid, supra note 177, at 200-02 (discussing the appearance
of hedge funds on Adelphia's creditors committee).
184. See Mayr, supra note 20, at 7; Nurnberg & Rosenblat, supra note 21; supra note
165.
185. See Brent Shearer, Awaiting a Wave of DistressedDeals: RestructuringFirms Are
Gearing Up for a Surge in Activity . . . Whenever That Might Occur, Mergers &
Acquisitions: Deal Maker's J.,
Mar. 1, 2007, at 36, 38; see also Mark Berman & Jo Ann J.
Brighton, Will the Sunlight of Disclosure Chill Hedge Funds? The Tale of Northwest
Airlines, Am. Bankr. Inst. J., May 2007, at 24, 24 (noting that "hedge funds are not confined
to a single type of investment and might acquire an interest at any one or more places in a
company's capital structure").
186. See Berman & Brighton, supra note 185, at 64 (noting that hedge funds "might hold
multiple interests in a chapter 11 case"); see also Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge
Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021, 1033-34
(2007) (noting that short selling relies on the theory that current market price is inaccurate);
Professors Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock describe the mechanics of short selling:
Consider what happens when someone "shorts" a stock. In a short sale, a
brokerage house typically arranges for a short seller to acquire shares from a
broker (sometimes itself) or bank that holds shares (in a fungible mass) for its
custodial clients, subject to an obligation to return a share at some later date. The
short seller then sells the shares to some third party, who will take full title and be
entirely oblivious to the source of the shares.
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investors must comply with Rule 2019 when they appear and participate
through ad hoc groups.
C. Openness and Honesty Through Disclosure: Rule 2019 in Practice
Under the Bankruptcy Code, Rule 2019 plays an important role in the
appearance and participation of ad hoc groups in Chapter 11 cases. Rule
2019, specifically, is carried over from the disclosures originally
promulgated by the SEC report. 187 The U.S. Supreme Court has the power
to promulgate rules governing the forms, practice, and procedure in
bankruptcy cases. 18 8 Like the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
189
Bankruptcy Rules must "be consistent with Acts of Congress."'
Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Rules "shall be construed to secure the19just,
0
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every case and proceeding."
1. Provisions of Rule 2019
Bankruptcy Rule 2019, "Representation of Creditors and Equity Security
Holders in Chapter 9 Municipality and Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases,"
requires certain disclosures in reorganization cases. 19 1 In particular, Rule
2019(a) sets forth various disclosure requirements for certain parties and
entities (other than official committees appointed by the U.S. trustee and
committees appointed to represent workers and retirees pursuant to section
1114) and applies only to cases under Chapter 9 or Chapter 11. 192
Generally, Rule 2019 applies to "every entity or committee representing
more than one creditor or equity security holder." 193 Each of these
Kahan & Rock, supra, at 1080.

187. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019 advisory committee's note (stating that the rule "is derived
from §§ 209-213 of the [1938 Chandler] Act and former Chapter X Rule 10-211"). Section
209 of the Chandler Act gave creditors or stockholders the right to proceed "in person, by an
attorney at law, or by a duly authorized agent or committee." Chandler Act § 209, 52 Stat.
840, 895 (repealed 1978). Section 210 required that attorneys file a statement "setting forth
the names and addresses" of their client creditors or stockholders, "the nature and amounts
of their claims or stock, and the time of acquisition thereof, except as to claims or stock
alleged to have been acquired more than one year prior to the filing of the petition. Id. § 210.
188. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2000).
189. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a).
190. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1001.
191. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019.
2019.01 (explaining the
192. Id.; see also Resnick & Sommer, supra note 39,
application of the Rule to only Chapters 9 and 11 to be the result of greater participation in
cases by creditors and equity holders).
193. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019. Under the Chandler Act, attorneys needed to file disclosure
statements, as did every "person or committee" representing more than twelve creditors and
every indenture trustee. See Chandler Act §§ 210-211, 52 Stat 840, 895 (repealed 1978).
The word "entity" thus seems to have replaced both the words "attorney" and "person" in the
Chandler Act. Under Rule 2019, an indenture trustee must also make similar disclosures,
but the rule specifically allows the court to order otherwise. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019(a);
2019.02 (concluding that applying Rule 2019 to
Resnick & Sommers, supra note 39,
indenture trustees is consistent with their fiduciary status and that indenture trustees must
comply if they wish to appear on behalf of the beneficiaries of their indentures).
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representing bodies must file a verified statement setting forth the names
and addresses of the represented creditors or equity security holders, 194 the
nature and amount of their claims or equity interests, and the time those
claims or interests were acquired. 195 The statements must also explain the
circumstances and facts that gave rise to the employment of the
representing entity. 196 If the representing entity is a committee, the
the committee and who agreed to
committee should disclose who organized
19 7
act and appear in the bankruptcy case.
Finally, disclosure statements must say whether or not the representing
entity has any claims or interests itself. This disclosure must be made as of
the time the entity was employed as a representative, the time the
committee was organized or formed, or the time when the indenture trustee
appears in the case. 198 If the representing entity itself holds claims or
equity interests (e.g., an attorney representing multiple creditors has its own
claims), then it must disclose the amount of claims or interests it owns, the
times when those claims or interests were acquired, and the amounts paid
for those claims or interests. In addition, it must disclose any sales or
dispositions of claims or interests. 199 Similarly, disclosure of this
information is required by an indenture trustee and by every member of an
unofficial committee. 200 A party governed by Rule 2019 who fails to file
such a disclosure statement may be denied the right to be "heard further or
to intervene in the case" or have "any authority, acceptance, rejection, or
objection given" voided.20 1
2. Interpretations of Rule 2019
These disclosure requirements were rarely interpreted by the bankruptcy
courts with respect to ad hoc groups until the Northwest and Scotia cases in
2007.202 Previously, it was generally understood that Rule 2019 applied to
those acting in a representative capacity-to both attorneys and other
194. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019(a)(1).
195. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019(a)(2). If creditors or equity holders acquired their claims
more than one year before the date of the petition, though, the statements need not contain
the time of acquisition. Id.
196. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019(a)(3).

197. Id. ("[I]n the case of a committee, [statements must include] the name or names of
the entity or entities at whose instance, directly or indirectly, the employment was arranged
or the committee was organized or agreed to act .....
198. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019(a)(4).
199. Id.
200. Id. ("[W]ith reference to the time of the employment of the entity, the organization
or formation of the committee, or the appearance in the case of any indenture trustee,
[disclosure must include] the amounts of claims or interests owned by the entity, the
members of the committees or the indenture trustee, the times when acquired, the amounts
paid therefor, and any sale or other disposition thereof."). The statement must also include a
copy of the instrument giving the representing entity the power to represent creditors or
equity security holders. Id.
201. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019(b).
202. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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entities and committees representing others' interests. 20 3 However, courts
generally agreed that the rule required different disclosures for different
representations. 20 4 For instance, the most typical representation is the
attorney-client representation. When an attorney represents multiple clients
in the Chapter 1 I case, he or she must file a verified statement in
accordance with Rule 2019(a)(2) and disclose the nature and amount of the
client creditors' claims and the times of acquisition thereof. However,
when another representative relationship exists-such as an unofficial
committee representing the interests of other creditors-the members of the
committee must also give additional disclosures under Rule 2019(a)(3)(4).205 Specifically, committees must disclose the name of the person or
group organizing the committee, the amount of claims owned by the
committee members, the times when these claims were acquired, the
amounts paid for the claims, and any sales of claims by committee
206
members.
a. Disclosuresby Attorneys RepresentingMultiple Creditors
or Equity Security Holders
There is almost universal agreement that Rule 2019 requires an attorney
or law firm to file a verified statement when it represents more than one
creditor or equity security holder. 207 The representing entity, the law firm
and/or lawyer, must disclose the represented parties' claims and the times
those claims were acquired. 20 8 In addition, the representing entity must
20 9
disclose its holdings, if any, under Rule 2019(a)(4).
203. See Resnick & Sommer, supra note 39, 2019.02. Rule 2019 "covers entities which
act in a fiduciary capacity that are not otherwise subject to the control of the court....
Entities... that assume the representation of a group must be subject to some court control
because they are fiduciaries to those they purport to represent. It is through Rule 2019 that
the court monitors such entities." Id.
204. See supra note 30 (discussing In re CF Holding Corp., 145 B.R. 124 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1992) and its distinction between disclosure of creditors' interests and representing
entity's interests).
205. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019(a)(3)-(4); Resnick & Sommer, supra note 39, 2019.02.
206. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019(a)(3)-(4).
207. See, e.g., In re Muralo Co., 295 B.R. 512, 524 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2003) (deciding that
Rule 2019 requirements apply to counsel); In re Okla. P.A.C. First Ltd. P'ship, 122 B.R.
387, 390-91 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1990) (noting that a fiduciary relationship between attorney
and clients brings attorneys into disclosure requirements of Rule 2019); Resnick & Sommer,
supra note 39, 2019.02. But see Flaschen & Mayr, supra note 39, at 991 (arguing that the
application of Rule 2019 to mandate disclosure by attorneys is incorrect because Rule 2019
is "aimed at persons having the delegated authority to act on behalf of a larger group" and
not at "'attorneys-at-law' .. . [who] advocate their clients' positions but ... do not make
their clients' decisions unless they have an express power of attorney to do so").
208. See CF Holding, 145 B.R. at 127 (explaining that Rule 2019(a)(2) applies to claims
held by represented parties, i.e., the individual creditors or equity security holders, in the
bankruptcy case); see also Muralo, 295 B.R. at 525 n.10 ("A properly filed statement...
should indicate the relationship between the filing entity and the creditors named in the
submission."); Resnick & Sommer, supra note 39, 2019.04[1]-[2].
209. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019; Resnick & Sommer, supra note 39,
2019.04[1] ("In
addition, the statement must include, with respect to the representative filing it or the
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b. Disclosuresby Other Representative Entities

However, entities other than attorneys must also file statements under
Rule 2019 if they are involved in a consensual agency relationship. In In re
Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., for instance, Consumers Union, a nonprofit
organization, appeared in the airline reorganization case and moved to
compel the debtor to adopt refund procedures for prepetition ticket
holders. 2 10 Consumers Union filed a statement listing eight individuals
who had completed disclosure under Rule 2019.211
The organization
claimed that it acted on behalf of these eight individuals, its members and
subscribers, and all other individuals who held prepaid tickets. 2 12 After
determining that the organization was not a party in interest entitled to be
heard in the bankruptcy case, 2 13 the bankruptcy court held that Consumers
Union did not fulfill the requirements of Rule 2019 because it had failed to
follow the necessary steps "[t]o be an authorized agent of a multiple
grouping." 2 14 Consumers Union had received specific authorization from
only 8 of over 100,000 ticket holders. 2 15 This did not meet Rule 2019's
requirements because the ticket holders had not all given their "express
2 16
authorization" that Consumers Union represent their interests.
Consumers Union failed to show that "this general agency relationship is
consensual in nature." 2 17 Thus, Rule 2019's purpose, according to the
2 18
court, is to regulate those in consensual positions of agency.
members of a committee complying with the rule, the amounts and times of acquisition of
claims against or interests in the debtor and the amounts paid therefor."); cf CF Holding,
145 B.R. at 127 ("Rule 2019(a)(4)... applies to the entity filing the Rule 2019 statement
(e.g. the respondents) not the parties represented by the respondents.").
210. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 101 B.R. 844, 847 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989).
211. Id. at 847-48.
212. Id. (including in its list of represented entities "in general, and not as a designated
class, other similarly situated [parties] who h[e]ld prepaid... tickets").
213. Id. at 849-50 (noting that the organization lacked any right to payment, had not
purchased any airline tickets, did not lend any money or assets to the estate, or have an
equitable claim).
214. Id. at 851.
215. Id. at 852.
216. Id. ("[N]ot all ticketholder claimants or creditors have given their express
authorization to CU; and . . . even where authorization was given, only three individuals
have specified the amount of their claims.").
217. Id.
218. Id. ("This rule places the burden on the party seeking agency status for several
claimants."); see also Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Future Asbestos Claim
Representative (In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp.), 327 B.R. 554, 559 (D. Del. 2005) (holding
that Rule 2019 is designed to ensure that those participating in Chapter 11 reorganizations
and plan confirmations are "authorized to act on behalf of the real parties in interest"). The
court in Ionosphere reasoned that Consumers Union's failure to comply with the substantive
requirements of Rule 2019 made it "dubious" that it could act "on behalf of' the eight named
ticket holders, "let alone the entire class of unnamed Ticketholders." Ionosphere, 101 B.R. at
853; accord In re Southland Corp., 124 B.R. 211,227 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991) (holding that
Rule 2019 applies "[w]here an entity represents more than one creditor or interest owner"
because the entity is required to include "a list of claimants or owners on behalf of whom
votes are being cast"). Agency is defined as the "fiduciary relation which results from the
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and
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c. Exceptions to Rule 2019

However, not all those parties in consensual agency relationships must
file

Rule

2019 statements;

rather,

Rule 2019 applies

to those

in

fiduciary/agency relationships who are not otherwise under the supervision
of the court. For instance, in the case of attorneys or law firms representing
a class of plaintiffs properly certified as a class for class action purposes,
the law firm need not disclose the underlying holdings of each member of
the class. 2 19 In the Kaiser Aluminum Corp. reorganization, the U.S. District

Court for the District of Delaware ruled that the law firms that represented
thousands of asbestos personal injury claimants were not required to file
every document by which they became official representatives of the
individual claimants. 22 0 Reasoning that such a requirement would be too
onerous, the court determined that "[i]t has been recognized that Rule 2019
need not always be strictly applied" and approved the bankruptcy court's
remedy of filing exemplars of the agreements instead because they could
fulfill the main purpose of Rule 2019: verifying representation. 22 1 This

purpose must be balanced against another important consideration:
222
ensuring that any information filed with the court is not misused.

In addition, an entity who, although representing others, obtains a money
judgment in its favor directly need not file a Rule 2019 statement. 223 Such
rulings comport with the premise of Rule 2019 that it be a mechanism for

the court to monitor those groups acting in a fiduciary capacity who are not
governed by any other regulations. 224

Because these groups are already

subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." Restatement (Second) of Agency §
1 (1958); see also Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001).
219. See, e.g., In re Am. Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d 487, 493 n.6 (7th Cir. 1988); Trebol
Motors Distrib. Corp. v. Bonilla (In re Trebol), 220 B.R. 500, 503 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998)
(holding that certified classes are single creditors not covered by Rule 2019); Wilson v.
Valley Elec. Membership Corp., 141 B.R. 309, 314-15 (E.D. La. 1992) (holding compliance
in a class action situation to be impractical); In re Craft, 321 BR. 189, 191 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 2005) (noting that several courts exempt class action plaintiffs from Rule 2019).
220. Kaiser, 327 B.R. at 559.
221. Id. at 559-60.
222. See id. at 560 (noting that the bankruptcy court's order requiring Rule 2019
information to be filed under seal with the Clerk of the Court and allowing parties in interest
to move the court for access to the information "strike[s] the appropriate balance between
maintaining the public's right to access the Rule 2019 information and ensuring that the
information is not misused").
223. See In re MJ Metal Prods., 292 B.R. 702, 704 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 2003) (noting that
the National Labor Relations Board did not have to file a Rule 2019 statement because it
obtained a money judgment, rather than the individual wage earners whose interests it
represented in the suit); Resnick & Sommers, supra note 39, 2019.02.
224. See In re Okla. P.A.C. First Ltd. P'ship, 122 B.R. 387, 390 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1990)
("Rule 2019 covers entities which act in a fiduciary capacity but which are not otherwise
subject to the control of the court."); Rapisardi, supra note 39 ("At its core, Rule 2019 uses
disclosure to regulate ad hoc committees and other representative entities . . . over which the
bankruptcy court holds no other statutory oversight."); Resnick & Sommers, supra note 39,
2019.02.
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225
the catch-all provision of
regulated by other more specific regulations,
226
them.
regulate
Rule 2019 is not needed to
Further, at least one court has taken the position that Rule 2019
disclosures are required, although the public filing of them is sometimes
inappropriate. In an order applying to all asbestos-related Chapter 11 cases
pending before her in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Delaware, Judge Judith K. Fitzgerald entered an order requiring all Rule
2019 disclosures to be made under seal with the clerk of the bankruptcy
court. 227 Judge Fitzgerald reasoned that the advent of electronic case filing
in federal bankruptcy cases allows parties' information to "get[] spread on
the public docket and that is not appropriate." 2 28 The order required a party
seeking Rule 2019 disclosures to make a motion before the bankruptcy
court stating the reasons it needed the information before it would be
released. 229 Such a ruling reflected the realities that electronic filing makes
Rule 2019 disclosures easily accessible to the public, and that a
compromise must be reached between the theoretical goal of open and
honest reorganization and the practical interest in protecting parties'
relevant information. Hedge funds and other institutional investors take this
into account when trying to comply with Rule 2019.

3. Rule 2019 and Ad Hoc Groups
In Chapter 11 cases, ad hoc investor groups frequently file statements
pursuant to Rule 2019 that, on their face, fail to satisfy the requirements of
Rule 2019.
These statements, filed as statements of the law firm
representing the ad hoc groups, attempt to satisfy the disclosure
requirements of Rule 2019(a)(2); however, they often do not fully disclose
the information sought by Rule 2019.230 In Adelphia, for example, a
225. E.g., Nat'l Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000) (establishing the
National Labor Relations Board and governing its actions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (governing
class actions); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7023 (governing class actions in bankruptcy cases and
proceedings).
226. But see Rapisardi, supra note 39 ("Courts uniformly agree the degree to which a
bankruptcy court decides to enforce or interpret Rule 2019's requirements is within the
bankruptcy court's discretion.").
227. See Amendatory Order Requiring Filing of Statements Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P.
2019, In re Owens Coming, No. 00-3837 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 27, 2004).
228. Transcript of Argument on All Delaware Asbestos Cases Regarding 2019 Order
Before Honorable Judith K. Fitzgerald U.S. Bankruptcy Judge at 55, Owens Corning, No.
00-3837 (Oct. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Owens Corning, Oct. 6, 2004, Hearing Transcript].
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., Fourth Supplemental Verified Statement of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 2019, In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp.,
368 B.R. 140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 02-41729) [hereinafter Weil Fourth Amended
Rule 2019 Statement]; Seventh Amended Verified Statement of Brown Rudnick Berlack
Israels LLP Pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019(a), Adelphia, 368 B.R. 140 (No. 02-41729)
[hereinafter Brown Rudnick Rule 2019 Statement]. The Weil Rule 2019 statement asserts
that the firm represented "certain holders, or investment advisors to certain holders," Weil
Fourth Amended Rule 2019 Statement, supra, at 1, while the Brown Rudnick Rule 2019
statement asserts that "[c]ounsel appears in these cases on behalf of the Ad Hoc Adelphia
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number of ad hoc groups appearing in the motion in aid process 23 1 filed
Rule 2019 statements. One group of noteholders, holders of subordinated
notes issued by the Adelphia parent company, appeared through counsel as
"certain holders, or investment advisors to certain holders" of senior notes
issued by Adelphia Communications Corp., the parent company in
Adelphia's corporate structure. 232 The Rule 2019 statement filed by Weil
Gotshal & Manges LLP, their counsel, identified each client it represented
233
in the firm's contact information located directly above the case caption.
Weil stated that it represented "certain holders, or investment advisors to
certain holders .

.

.

of the following notes and debentures," 2 34 and

abbreviated the group, for purposes of the Rule 2019 statement, as the
"ACC Senior Noteholders." 2 35 The names and addresses of the noteholders
were set forth on schedule A to the Weil Rule 2019 statement. 236 The Rule
2019 statement also asserted that "[tihe ACC Senior Noteholders have
advised [Weil] that, as of September 8, 2006, they are the beneficial owners
of, or the holders of the investment authority, contractual authority, or
voting authority with respect to, more than $1.03 billion face amount of the
Senior Notes. The Senior Notes held by the ACC Senior Noteholders were
acquired on a number of dates." 237 At no time in its notice of appearance or
in its Rule 2019 statement did Weil refer to the group as a "committee," but
2019 statement fail to
both the notice of appearance and the Weil 2Rule
38
noteholders.
individual
of
holdings
the
identify
On the other hand, the Rule 2019 statement filed by Brown Rudnick
Berlack Israels LLP stated that the firm appeared in the case "on behalf of
the Ad Hoc Adelphia Trade Claims Committee" and then listed the names
239
and addresses of the committee "members" on an attached schedule.
Brown Rudnick asserted that the "members of the Committee" held claims
"arising as the holder of trade claims ...against Adelphia... and its debtor
subsidiaries" but that the members' claims were not limited to just these
Furthermore, the firm claimed that the members held
holdings. 240

Trade Claims Committee" that held "claims arising as the holders of trade claims ... against
Adelphia... and its debtor subsidiaries." Brown Rudnick Rule 2019 Statement, supra, at 1.
231. See generally In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 368 B.R. 140, 148-49 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2007). The Adelphia case is just one example of bondholder groups appearing and
participating in Chapter I1 reorganizations. For an account of the role of bondholders in the
Marvel Comics bankruptcy case, see generally Raviv, supra note 169.
232. Notice of Appearance Pursuant to Rules 2002, 9007, and 9010(b) of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and Section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code at 1, Adelphia,
368 BR. 140 (No. 02-41729) [hereinafter Weil Notice of Appearance].
233. See Weil Fourth Amended Rule 2019 Statement, supra note 230, at I.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See id. at2,4.
237. Id. at 2.
238. See generally id.; Weil Notice of Appearance, supra note 232; see also supra note
32.
239. Brown Rudnick Rule 2019 Statement, supra note 230, at 1.
240. Id.
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24 1
approximately $532 million in face value of the outstanding trade claims,
but that "the exact amount of the Trade Claims cannot be presently
determined. '242 Brown Rudnick did not list the date of acquisition of the
claims or the individual holdings of each committee member, 243 and
that the aggregate amount of claims the committee held
explicitly stated
244
was unknown.
The Brown Rudnick statement admitted to a very important issue in
Adelphia, namely, the holding of claims other than the claims represented
through the ad hoc group. This problem was particularly troubling in
Adelphia, as, although Brown Rudnick disclosed its clients' other claims in
the case, Rule 2019 did not require disclosure of investors' holdings in
other areas of the corporate structure, and other ad hoc groups were accused
245
of short selling while actively involved in the motion in aid proceedings. 246
The practice of short selling on other holdings within the capital structure
(but not within the particular debt position represented in the bankruptcy
case) can have significant impacts on investor participation in bankruptcy.
As noted by David M. Stem, cocounsel to the official committee of
unsecured creditors in Adelphia, short selling is not necessarily "inherently
wrong." 24 7 However, short selling creates economic interests separate from
those interests represented in the bankruptcy case, and such an interest may

241. The term "Trade Claims" referred to only those claims held by members of the Ad
Hoc Adelphia Trade Claims Committee. See id. at 2.
242. Id. The statement also asserted that "[m]embers of the Committee requested that
Counsel represent them in connection with the Chapter 11 Cases. Counsel has been and will
be compensated by the Committee." Id.
243. See id.
244. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
245. See Transcript of Hearing Held October 30, 2006 at 7-10, In re Adelphia Commc'ns
Corp., 368 B.R. 140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 02-41729) [hereinafter Adelphia, Oct. 30,
2006, Hearing Transcript]. Brown Rudnick's clients, the Ad Hoc Committee of Adelphia
Trade Claim Claimants, was not involved in the short-selling issue in Adelphia. Id. Rather,
their statement indicating that clients may have held other claims in the case is highlighted in
light of other participants' failure to include such information in their Rule 2019 statements.
However, Brown Rudnick did not disclose what other claims were held by its clients. See
generally Brown Rudnick Rule 2019 Statement, supra note 230.
246. Many institutional investors remain "unrestricted" and are allowed to continue
buying and selling claims or equity interests against a corporate debtor throughout that
debtor's bankruptcy litigations because they do not have access to confidential company
information. See In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 368 B.R. 140, 152 n.11 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed as moot, 371 B.R. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Roundtable, The Final
Chapter: Negotiations in Restructuring, High Yield Report, Apr. 9, 2007, at 12, 12
(interviewing Timothy Coleman, Senior Managing Director, Blackstone Group).
247. Adelphia, Oct. 30, 2006, Hearing Transcript, supra note 245, at 9. Professors Kahan
and Rock note the positive functions of short selling outside the bankruptcy context:
Even if they are short-term oriented, hedge funds' short-term strategies may
perform valuable functions. For example, when hedge funds play their traditional
role of arbitraging market inefficiencies, their pursuit of short-term profit will be
one of the mechanisms that helps to bring the market price into alignment with the
value of the firm.
Kahan & Rock, supra note 186, at 1083 n.263. The practice of holding positions in multiple
layers of a corporate structure is increasingly common in Chapter 11. See supra note 23.
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implicate certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code dealing with good faith
negotiations in the formulation and acceptance of a plan of
reorganization. 248 However, as noted in one hearing in Adelphia, Rule
2019 does not cover this particular situation.249
These examples from Adelphia illustrate the varying practices of Rule
2019 in action. For many years, ad hoc groups appeared and filed verified
Rule 2019 statements without much discussion. 250 The little case law on
Rule 2019 had focused on vetting attorneys representing class action
plaintiffs. 25 1 "[C]ourts have not always uniformly enforced the rule's
disclosure requirements. In fact, some commentators have advocated
against strict enforcement .... ,"252
Thus, at the beginning of 2007, Rule 2019 acted mainly as a guideline for
ad hoc groups. Ad hoc groups filed statements that gave some disclosures,
but not all of the disclosures required in Rule 2019. In 2007, however,
courts began to develop more fully the ways in which the rule applied to ad
hoc investor groups. Part II of this Note discusses the two cases decided by
bankruptcy courts addressing the required disclosures by ad hoc groups
appearing in Chapter 11 reorganizations.
II. AD Hoc GROUPS IN CHAPTER 11: RULE 2019
AND DISCLOSURE DISPUTES

In two recent cases from 2007, a new line of jurisprudence on Rule 2019
emerged as two bankruptcy courts split regarding how the rule applied to ad
hoc, informal groups of investors holding debt and equity securities. Judge
Gropper in Northwest acknowledged that his decision ran contrary to the
common industry practice of incomplete disclosure, 2 53 but relied on the
plain meaning of Rule 2019 to require that a group calling itself a
"committee" disclose under Rule 2019(a)(4) as a committee. 254 On the
other hand, Judge Schmidt's decision in Scotia indicated that common
practice could inform the meaning of Rule 2019, and thus, ad hoc groups,
unlike the committees recognized throughout reorganization history, were
just a "bunch of creditors. '25 5 Part II of this Note examines the two
competing opinions and the positions on each side of requiring disclosure
248. Adelphia, Oct. 30, 2006, Hearing Transcript, supra note 245, at 9.
249. Id. at 7-8.
250. See Mayr, supra note 20, at 1 (noting that it had been "almost 70 quiet years on the
books without controversy").
251. See Rapisardi, supra note 39.

252. Id.
253. See In re Northwest Airlines Corp. (Northwest 1), 363 B.R. 701, 704 (Bankr.

S.D.N.Y. 2007) (acknowledging the committee argument that the Rule "has been frequently
ignored or watered down"); supra Part I.C.3.
254. See generally Northwest I, 363 B.R. 701.
255. See Scotia, Apr. 17, 2007, Hearing Transcript, supra note 36, at 5; see also Order

Denying Scotia Pacific Co. LLC's Motion for an Order Compelling the Ad Hoc Noteholder
Group to Fully Comply with Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a) by Filing a Complete & Proper
Verified Statement Disclosing Its Membership & Their Interests at 2, In re Scotia Dev.,
LLC, No. 07-20027 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2007).
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by ad hoc groups as committees. Part ILA discusses Judge Gropper's view
requiring classification of ad hoc groups as committees, while Part II.B
explores the various arguments against classification as a committee,
including the positions advanced by the noteholder group in Scotia and the
leading financial market participant organizations.
A. Northwest Airlines: Committee Classificationand Disclosure
In the Northwest Chapter 11 case, a group of equity security holders
calling themselves the Ad Hoc Committee of Equity Security Holders
appeared through counsel in the reorganization proceedings. 2 56 During the
course of the case, 25 7 the debtors filed a motion for an order compelling the
Ad Hoc Committee to file a more complete verified statement pursuant to
Rule 2019(a). 258 Judge Gropper ruled that Rule 2019 required the Ad Hoc
Committee to disclose "the amounts of claims or interests owned by the
the amounts paid
members of the committee, the times when acquired,
'2 59
therefor, and any sales or other disposition thereof.
1. Plain Meaning of Rule 2019
According to Judge Gropper, the "plain terms" of Rule 2019's use of the
260
word "committee" dictated that the investors disclose their claims data.
Because the members purported to speak for the group, their appearance
"implicitly" asked others to afford their position significant weight in the
resolution of key issues in the case. 26 1 Such a request required disclosure in

256. See Northwest I, 363 B.R. at 701.
257. The equity holders were engaged in a "heated discovery dispute" with the debtors.
Seymour Roberts Jr. & Joe Wielebinski, Hedge Fund Secrecy vs. Bankruptcy Code
Disclosure Requirements, Tex. Law., May 21, 2007, at 25, 25; see also Rapisardi, supra note
39 (stating that the Rule 2019 motion was "[i]n response to the Ad Hoc Committee's
discovery tactics"). In addition, shortly after appearing and filing their Rule 2019 statement,
the equity holders moved for the appointment of an official committee of equity security
holders. See Paul D. Leake & Mark G. Douglas, Ad Hoc Committee Disclosure
Requirements-A Bitter Pill to Swallow for Distressed Investors (2007), available at
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/0a396e1 a-a5ef-4565-aa63Offd9b5e298f/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/430866bd-i 0b4-4267-9f7814b09539c6b9/JDNYI_3996293_12019%2OArticle%20for%2OMayjune%202007%20B
RR.pdf.
258. Motion of the Debtors for (I) an Order Imposing Civil Contempt Sanctions on the
Ad Hoc Committee & Awarding Attorneys' Fees & Costs to the Debtors, (II) A Protective
Order Pursuant to Rules 26(c) & 45(c)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, & (III) An
Order Compelling the Ad Hoc Committee to File a Verified Statement Pursuant to
Bankruptcy Rule 2019(A), Northwest 1, 363 B.R. 701 (No. 05-17930).
259. Northwest I, 363 B.R. at 702 (quoting Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019).
260. Id. at 701 (holding that the clients appeared as a "committee," that their notice of
appearance was as a committee, and that counsel was retained by the committee, so
therefore, the committee members must disclose the nature and amount of their claims); see
also Rapisardi, supra note 39 ("While garnering much attention, the disclosure of
information is not unprecedented. As such, the bankruptcy court's Northwest decision
merely enforces the plain language of Rule 2019.").
261. Northwest 1, 363 B.R. at 703.
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light of the history of Rule 2019, which dated back to the SEC report, 262
because committee opinions should not be given an audience before the
263
court unless the committee's economic interests are revealed.
Consequently, he ordered the Ad Hoc Committee to comply strictly with
the provisions of Rule 2019,264 and subsequently denied their motion to file
65
2
the information under seal.

First, the "plain" meaning of "committee" required that the ad hoc group
disclose as a committee. 266 Because the law firm appeared in the case "on
behalf of' the Ad Hoc Committee, the group's Rule 2019 statement
revealed. conclusively that counsel believed it was representing a committee
under Rule 2019.267 Rejecting the argument that Rule 2019 did not require
disclosure because the Ad Hoc Committee did not represent any party other
than itself, Judge Gropper found the Ad Hoc Committee's repeated
reference to itself as a committee indicated that the members also
considered it a committee. 268 Unlike the case in which "a law firm
represents several individual clients and is the only entity required to file a
Rule 2019 statement, on its own behalf,"269 Rule 2019(a)(4) properly
applied to the "formal organization of a group of creditors holding similar
'270
claims, who have elected to consolidate their collection efforts.
Consequently, the Ad Hoc Committee was a committee under Rule 2019.
Then, relying on the SEC report, the court stated that "[u]nofficial
committees have long been active in reorganization cases." 2 7 1 However, as
the SEC argued in its report, committee involvement in reorganizations
could not go unchecked; disclosure was necessary to encourage fair and

262.
263.
264.
265.

See generally SEC, supra note 56.
Northwest I, 363 B.R. at 704.
See id.
See In re Northwest Airlines Corp. (Northwest I1), 363 B.R. 704, 707 (Bankr.

S.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying a subsequent motion to file an amended Rule 2019 statement under
seal because the committee members' "investment strategies" were not protected
information and ought to be public).
266. Northwest I, 363 B.R. at 702.
267. Id. at 702. The statement filed by counsel to the equity security holders disclosed
that the firm "appears on behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee of Equity Security Holders... ; it
identifies the 11 members of the Committee; discloses that, [t]he members of the Ad Hoc
Equity Committee own, in the aggregate, 16,195,200 shares of common stock of Northwest
and claims against the Debtors in the aggregate amount of $164.7 million and that, [s]ome of
the shares of common stock and some of the claims were acquired by the members of the Ad
Hoc Equity Committee after the commencement of the Cases." Id. (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
268. Id. at 703. Judge Allan L. Gropper cited the fact that the committee's notice of
appearance "was as a committee"; that the committee made certain motions in the hearing;
that counsel was apparently retained "by the 'Committee'; and that the "law firm does not
purport to represent the separate interests of any Committee member; it takes its instructions
from the Committee as a whole and represents one entity for purposes of the Rule." Id.
269. Id. (distinguishing the instant case from CF Holding Corp. because, in that case, "a
firm represented multiple creditors" who were unrelated and were not acting as a group).
270. Id. at 703 (quoting Wilson v. Valley Elec. Membership Corp., 141 B.R. 309, 314
(E.D. La. 1992)).
271. Id. at 704.
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equitable plans of reorganization
by requiring committees to disclose their
2 72
full economic interests.
Furthermore, Judge Gropper's position was supported by a decision of
Judge Richard Sear of the Eastern District of Louisiana, the chairman of the
Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules at the time Rule 2019 was
adopted. 273 In Wilson v. Valley Electric Membership Corp., Judge Sear
ruled that a class action plaintiff need not submit documentation of each
underlying class member's claim, because "Rule 2019 more appropriately
seems to apply to the formal organization of groups of creditors holding
similar claims, who have elected to consolidate their collection efforts,
rather than to class actions. '2 74 That was "exactly the situation in this case,
except that here there are shareholders rather than creditors. '275 The longstanding history of Rule 2019 gave Judge Gropper "no basis for fail[ing] to
'2 76
apply it as written.
Finally, the Bankruptcy Code contemplated unofficial committees, and
27 7
any such unofficial committee must comply with Rule 2019 strictly.
Appearance as a committee meant that "the members purport to speak for a
group and implicitly ask the court and other parties to give their positions a
2 78
degree of credibility appropriate to a unified group with large holdings."
Thus, while ad hoc or unofficial committees play an important role in
Chapter 11 bankruptcies, that role was subject to the disclosure rules
regulating their appearance in bankruptcy cases. 2 79 As a result, the
272. Id. (citing the SEC report in holding that disclosure was necessary to comport with
the goal of"provid[ing] ... disclosure... in order to help foster fair and equitable plans free
from deception and overreaching" and concluding that Rule 2019 was "'a comprehensive
regulation of representation in ...chapter 11 reorganization cases' (quoting Fed. R. Bankr.
P. 2019 advisory committee's note)); see also Rapisardi, supra note 39 ("Because of the
limited oversight over ad hoc committees, bankruptcy courts have used Rule 2019 to verify
an ad hoc committee actually represents the claims and interests which such committee
purports to represent.").
273. Northwest1, 363 B.R. at 703 (citing Wilson, 141 B.R. at 315).
274. Wilson, 141 BR. at 315.
275. Northwest I, 363 B.R. at 703.
276. Id. at 704.
277. Id. at 703 ("[T]he Bankruptcy Code specifically provides for the possibility of the
grant of compensation to 'a committee representing creditors or equity security holders other
than a committee appointed under section 1102 of this title [an official committee], in
making a substantial contribution in a case under chapter 9 or 11 of this title."' (second
alteration in original) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(D))); see In re Hill Stores Co., 137
B.R. 4, 8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (denying subordinated bondholders' motion to appoint an
official committee of subordinated bondholders and noting that, "if the subordinated
bondholders believe that the cases would be advanced by their taking a more active role,
they are not precluded from forming an unofficial committee.., and seeking reimbursement
of their expenses to the extent that they make a substantial contribution to the case, as
permitted and even envisioned by § 503(b) of the [Bankruptcy] Code").
278. Northwest 1, 363 B.R. at 703.
279. Id.; Berman & Brighton, supra note 185, at 64 ("It appears that the ad hoc
committee wanted the best of both worlds-namely, to form a committee to advance their
collective goals . ..while at the same time retaining the right to act to advance their
individual interests .... If nothing else, this ruling is a 'welcome to the bankruptcy court
process' greeting card for hedge funds. The benefit/burden concept is nothing new to those

2602

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

committee members were required to make the more detailed disclosures
mandated by Rule 2019(a)(4) applicable to members of a committee. 280
2. Open and Public Reorganization Cases
Following his order requiring compliance with Rule 2019(a)(4), Judge
Gropper denied a request to allow the equity holders to file their Rule 2019
statements under seal with the clerk of the bankruptcy court pursuant to
section 107(b) of the Bankruptcy Code because such a decision would
contradict the intent of the Bankruptcy Code that reorganizations be open to
the public at large. 28 1 Section 107(b) protects parties from having to
publicly disclose confidential research, development, or commercial
information, although this protection is an exception to the normal rule that
bankruptcy proceedings ought to be public record. 282 The ad hoc equity
committee had sought protection because they felt their trading information,
including the acquisition dates and prices paid for equity, was a commercial
28 3
secret and they feared disclosing it would harm their business practices.
Judge Gropper held that the individual investors' claims data was not
confidential commercial information because it did not cause "an unfair
advantage to competitors by providing them information as to...
commercial operations. '2 84 Because it was "improbable" that competitors

players that have been actively participating in the bankruptcy process for a long
time .. "); see also Rapisardi, supra note 39 (admitting the important role of ad hoc
groups).
280. See Northwest 1, 363 B.R. at 703; cf In re CF Holding Corp., 145 B.R. 124, 127
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1992) (noting that Rule 2019(a)(4) applies to the entity filing a verified
statement). Since Rule 2019 only applies to entities or committees representing other
creditors, subsection 2019(a)(4) applies to holdings of the entity appearing, i.e., the
committee or the attorney. While uncommon, attorneys occasionally have claims of their
own. See In re Okla. P.A.C. First Ltd. P'ship, 122 B.R. 387, 390 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1990) ("It
is not unusual in the Chapter 11 context for. . . informal committees to be represented by
one law firm, with the law firm to have the claims of the creditors or interested parties
assigned to it, so that the law firm may act on the parties' behalf.").
281. In re Northwest Airlines Corp. (Northwest I1), 363 B.R. 704, 707-08 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2007).
282. See 11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(1) (2000); Northwest 11, 363 B.R. at 706 (heralding the
Bankruptcy Code's fundamental principle of public and open proceedings); see also 11
U.S.C. § 107(a) (stating that records are "open to an examination by an entity at reasonable
times without charge").
283. See Northwest 11, 363 B.R. at 706; see also Roberts & Wielebinski, supra note 257,
at 25 ("[H]edge funds are noted for their secrecy. They don't want the public knowing who
their investors are, what they invest in, what they pay for their investments, or, most
importantly, what their return is on their investments.... Bankruptcy, on the other hand, is
the antithesis of secrecy.").
284. Northwest II, 363 B.R. at 706 (quoting In re Orion Picture Corp., 21 F.3d 24, 27 (2d
Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In a declaration submitted with the motion to
seal, one member of the ad hoc group stated that disclosure
clearly would damage our bargaining position and give our counterparties an
unfair advantage if they were to know our basis or acquisition cost of the assets we
were trying to sell. Just as car dealers do not disclose to customers their actual
acquisition cost of their cars, and builders do not disclose to potential home buyers
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of the funds would be able to discern their "investment strategies," filing
under seal ran contrary to the goal of "public dissemination" of information
as a means to prevent the abuses of reorganization identified by the SEC
report. 285 Even if the committee members had interests in keeping
information secret, the interest in preventing abuse of reorganization
overrode those interests because disclosure
is based on the premise that other shareholders have a right to information
as to Committee member purchases and sales so that they make an
informed decision whether this Committee will represent their interests or
whether they should consider forming a more broadly-based committee of
their own. It also gives all parties a better ability to gauge the credibility
of an important group
that has chosen to appear in a bankruptcy case and
286
play a major role.
In essence, Rule 2019 "gives other members of the class the right to know
where their champions are coming from.

'287

3. Discretionary Approach of Rule 2019
One commentator and Chapter 11 practitioner, John Rapisardi, wrote that
Judge Gropper's application of Rule 2019 was consistent with the plain
meaning of the Rule. 2 88 Since courts decide whether and how to enforce or
interpret Rule 2019, disclosure was not unprecedented. 289 The discretion
afforded to bankruptcy courts in deciding whether and how to apply Rule
their actual cost to build homes, we do not disclose to potential counterparties our
basis in our investments.
Declaration of Daniel Krueger in Support of Motion to Seal at 3, Northwest II, 363 B.R. 704
(No. 05-17930), quoted in Northwest II, 363 BR. at 708. But see Rapisardi, supra note 39
("[A] significant amount of information mandated by the bankruptcy court in Northwest
requires the Ad Hoc Committee to disclose information that is already public. Creditor
positions at the commencement of the case are disclosed in the debtor's schedules of assets
and liabilities .... [E]quity security holders disclose equity holdings in their Schedule 13D
SEC filings."). The central debate, however, is over "the price at which parties purchase
claims and stocks and the precise times of such purchases," which is not public. See id. at 6.
285. See Northwest II, 363 B.R. at 707-08; see also SEC, supra note 56, at 902
(explaining that information "will provide a routine method of advising the court and all
parties in interest of the actual economic interest of all persons participating in the
proceedings"). Judge Gropper concluded that "there is no reason to assume that the drafters
believed that the goals of the Rule could be achieved if the required information were filed
secretly." Northwest II, 363 B.R. at 708.
286. Northwest II, 363 B.R. at 709 (assuming that committee members did not owe
fiduciary duties to nonmembers). Judge Gropper further noted that these equity holders also
"own a very significant amount of debt" in addition to their equity positions. Id. He
concluded that Rule 2019 "is based on the premise that other shareholders have a right to
know whether the debt purchases were made at the same time as the purchases of stock, a
fact that might raise questions as to divided loyalties." Id. Finally, Judge Gropper was
concerned that members of the committee admitted that they may sell their claims at some
point, and this possibility is "exactly why there are disclosures required under Rule 2019."
Id.
287. Id. at 709.
288. Rapisardi, supra note 39.
289. Id.
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2019 to ad hoc groups is the proper protection in the event debtors and
other parties in interest try to use Rule 2019 to "gain access to increase
courts are
bargaining leverage or trade data" because bankruptcy
290
empowered to apply the Rule "as they see fair and just.

B. Scotia Development: Ad Hoc Groups as Just a "Bunch of Creditors"
Shortly after the Northwest ruling, Judge Schmidt rejected Judge
Gropper's approach in favor of a "practical approach." In In re Scotia
Development, LLC, the debtor filed a motion seeking an order to compel a
group of noteholders to comply strictly with Rule 2019.291 In a short order,
Judge Schmidt denied the motion on the grounds that the ad hoc group was
not a committee under the definition of Rule 2019.292 At the hearing
announcing his ruling, Judge Schmidt reasoned that the group of
noteholders were "at this point ... just one law firm representing a bunch of
creditors." 293 Admittedly, Judge Schmidt ruled in direct conflict with Judge
Gropper's decision in Northwest, but he did so because such a ruling was,
in his opinion, "a practical approach. '294 Judge Schmidt's brief articulation
of his decision was based in part on the arguments propounded by the
noteholders in Scotia, and it was supported by more detailed arguments
from LSTA and SIFMA. Part II.B summarizes these positions, which rely
heavily upon the history of Rule 2019 and the distinctions between the
function of ad hoc groups and the function of protective committees under

290. Id. at 6. Some have suggested that the Northwest case is a backdoor attempt to
regulate otherwise unrestricted hedge funds, and that the "bankruptcy judges look to be
seeking now to lay down some guideposts regarding hedge fund activities" in anticipation of
the next wave of bankruptcies.
Posting of Ben Feder to Overhedged,
http://overhedged.blogspot.com/2007/10/are-bankruptcy-courts-particularly-in.html (Oct. 26,
2007, 10:07 EST). However, Judge Gropper was seriously concerned about the significant
debt positions held by the Ad Hoc Committee members. Northwest II, 363 B.R. at 709;
supra note 286. In addition, such a cross-structure holding presents a serious threat to the
functioning of the bankruptcy system. See Berman & Brighton, supra note 185, at 64-65
(arguing that such a threat is "the greatest potential threat to the efficacy of the bankruptcy
system" because "[w]hether [an investor's] return [on investment] comes from a debt or an
equity security... doesn't matter" to the investor); supra notes 245-49. It is not entirely
clear that Rule 2019, as written, requires such disclosure, although it was a main factor in the
Northwest case.
291. Scotia Pacific Co. LLC's Motion for an Order Compelling the Ad Hoc Committee to
Fully Comply with Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a) by Filing a Complete & Proper Verified
Statement Disclosing Its Membership & Their Interests, In re Scotia Dev., LLC, No. 0720027 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2007).
292. Scotia, No. 07-20027, at 2 (Apr. 18, 2007) (holding that the noteholder group "is not
a 'committee' within the meaning of Bankruptcy Rule 2019 ... [and] is not subject to the
disclosure requirements under Bankruptcy Rule 2019").
293. Scotia, Apr. 17, 2007, Hearing Transcript, supra note 36, at 4-5 (noting that the ad
hoc group's counsel might have potential conflicts of interest as a result of its representation
of multiple creditors and that those creditors must understand those conflicts in order to
waive them). The court required counsel to continue disclosing the parties it represented,
which fell far short of the disclosures sought by the debtors. Id.
294. Id. at 4.
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the equity receivership system that was so heavily criticized by the SEC
report.
1. Noteholder Position in Scotia
In the Scotia case, the noteholder group, the Ad Hoc Group of Timber
Noteholders (Timber Noteholders) filed an extensive response to the
debtor's motion seeking strict compliance with Rule 2019. Because Judge
Schmidt ruled in the Timber Noteholders' favor but did not give a detailed
articulation of his position, it is helpful to explore the noteholders' position
to inform Judge Schmidt's ruling. This section explores the various
arguments provided by the Timber Noteholders in support of the position
that ad hoc investor groups are not committees under Rule 2019.
Specifically, their position relied on the plain and legal meanings of
committee and the history of Rule 2019.
In addition, the Timber
Noteholders maintained that Rule 2019 should not be used as a procedural
mechanism to deprive investors of substantive rights in contravention of the
statute permitting the enactment of rules of procedure in bankruptcy cases.
a. Plain Meaning of "Committee" in Rule 2019
The Timber Noteholders' primary argument was that ad hoc groups are
not committees by the plain meaning of the word "committee. ' 295 The
legal definition of a committee is a "'group of people appointed or elected
to consider, determine, or manage a matter."' 296 Because ad hoc groups are
"self-selecting" and do not speak for anyone except the group of
noteholders in the group, the group was not a committee. 297 Nor did the
group satisfy the nonlegal definition of committee, the Timber Noteholders
contended, because it was not a group of people "officially delegated to
perform a function." 298 Even though ad hoc groups like the group in
Northwest frequently call themselves committees, such self-description is
299
irrelevant if they do not meet the definition of a committee.
295. See Noteholder Group's Objection to Scotia Pacific Co. LLC's Motion for an Order
Compelling the Ad Hoc Committee to Fully Comply with Bankruptcy Rule 2 0 1 9(a) by
Filing a Complete & Proper Verified Statement Disclosing its Membership & Their Interests
at 7, Scotia, No. 07-20027 (Apr. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Timber Noteholders' Scotia Brief].

When a "statute's language is plain," there is no reason to look beyond the text to interpret
the statute. See United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
296. Timber Noteholders' Scotia Brief, supra note 295, at 7 (quoting Black's Law
Dictionary (7th ed. 1999)).

297. Timber Noteholders' Scotia Brief, supra note 295, at 7-8.
298. Id. at 8 (citation omitted).
299. See id.- at 8. The Ad Hoc Group of Timber Noteholders (Timber Noteholders) saw
the functions and characteristics of the group as determinative, not the mere nomenclature
used. Id.; see also Flaschen & Mayr, supra note 39, at 988 ("The fact that ad hoc groups
often colloquially describe themselves using the term 'committee' cannot be considered
dispositive, any more than a creditor calling itself 'secured' means that it must be treated as a
,secured' creditor within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. In fact, legal and general
dictionary definitions of the term 'committee' consistently contemplate a body that is
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Furthermore, ad hoc groups are not representative of any noteholders
outside of the group. Representation, the ad hoc group argued, "is at the
heart of the meaning of the term 'committee.' 30 0 But not just any
representation matters; rather, the representation that is important is that of
fiduciaries and agents. 30 1 Representatives act on another's behalf in a
principal-agent relationship. 30 2 Crucially, the Timber Noteholders argued,
they did not "stand for or act on behalf of anyone" and therefore did not
represent anyone within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Rules. 303 The
Bankruptcy Code clearly contemplates that committees represent those who
are not on the committee, yet ad hoc groups expressly disavow representing
304
anyone but themselves.
b. History of Rule 2019
The Timber Noteholders also argued that the history of Rule 2019
indicates that ad hoc groups are not committees under the Rule by
comparing modem ad hoc groups to the protective committees under equity
receiverships and the Chandler Act.
On the one hand, protective
committees were fiduciaries to those they represented. 30 5 The SEC report
was designed to address abuses of the equity receivership system and to
"combat the evils of protective committees." 30 6 The committees addressed
by Rule 2019, therefore, are only those "true committees that stand in a
fiduciary and representative capacity and have the ability to bind other
creditors in the same class." 30 7 Ad hoc groups, on the other hand, are not
like these protective committees-rather, the Noteholders argued, they are
appointed/elected to act in a representative/fiduciary capacity for a larger universe of
stakeholders than the committee's members.")
300. Timber Noteholders' Scotia Brief, supra note 295, at 8-9 (highlighting that "it is
explicitly stated in the most important part of Rule 2019(a), its first clause," that "it applies
to every 'committee representingmore than one creditor"').
301. See id. at 9 n.7 (stating that Rule 2019(a) applies to committees, lawyers, and
indenture trustees, and that given lawyers' and indenture trustees' fiduciary relationships to
their principals, it is logical that committees under Rule 2019 must also be fiduciaries of
those they represent).
302. Id. at 9.
303. Id. The Timber Noteholders also argued that the word "represent" and variations
thereof are used frequently in the Bankruptcy Code, and that "in each place it is clear that the
term is used consistent with the definition noted above as denoting someone who represents
someone else." Id. (citing 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(24) (West Supp. 2006) (defining a "foreign
representative" as "a person or body... authorized to act as a representative of such foreign
proceeding"); 11 U.S.C. § 323(a) (2000) ("The trustee in a case under this title is the
representative of the estate"); id. § 1114 (defining an "authorized representative" as the
"representative ...

for persons receiving any retiree benefits")).

304. Timber Noteholders' Scotia Brief, supra note 295, at 11; see also Flaschen & Mayr,
supra note 39, at 989 ("Ad hoc groups of investors do not act for anyone other than the
group's members and clearly do not serve as 'agents' or 'fiduciaries' to any party .... ).
305. See Timber Noteholders' Scotia Brief, supra note 295, at 14-15 (citing the SEC's
conclusion that emphasis must be given to the fact that protective committees occupy a
fiduciary position); see also supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
306. Timber Noteholders' Scotia Brief, supra note 295, at 14-15.
307. Id. at 16.
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simply "informal groups that gather for the purpose of sharing expenses and
conveniently speaking with one voice." 30 8 The differences between ad hoc
groups and protective committees were critical to the Timber Noteholders'
argument in Scotia that the ad hoc group was not a committee.
c. Fairnessof Rule 2019 's Application
The final argument presented in the Timber Noteholders' brief was that
ordering disclosure would abridge several of their fundamental rights, and
that such an order would be inconsistent with the goals of the Bankruptcy
Code and Bankruptcy Rules to achieve just, speedy, and inexpensive
resolutions of bankruptcy cases. 30 9 This equity, they argued, allowed the
court to construe Rule 2019 in a way that minimized the burden placed
should be read not to require
upon creditor groups, and thus Rule 2019
3 10
burdensome disclosures from creditors.
In addition, the debtor's interpretation of Rule 2019 would violate the
Rules Enabling Act's directive that Bankruptcy Rules "shall not abridge,
enlarge, or modify any substantive right. '3 11 Specifically, the Timber
Noteholders argued that the debtors' interpretation would affect four
fundamental rights: the equality of treatment of creditors, 3 12 their right to
be heard in the bankruptcy case, 3 13 the property rights of the Timber
Noteholders as secured creditors, 3 14 and their rights to maintain the
308. Id.
309. See id. at 20; see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1001 (requiring that Bankruptcy Rules be
constructed with the goal of speedy, inexpensive, and just resolutions of cases in mind); see
also Flaschen & Mayr, supra note 39, at 990 (arguing that due process and property rights
are substantial rights that "should not casually be denied" in order to "'enforce' a procedural
rule"); accordIn re Shank, 315 B.R. 799, 812 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2004) (concluding that strict
compliance with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001 was inconsistent with
Bankruptcy Rule 1001's goal of inexpensive resolution of cases).
310. See Timber Noteholders' Scotia Brief, supra note 295, at 20-21 (citing Shank, 315
B.R. at 812 ("A bankruptcy case imposes burdens on creditors.... But that injury need not
be compounded by imposing unnecessary costs on creditors who desire to participate fairly
in the process. ... Rule 1001's directive requires a bankruptcy court to apply the bankruptcy
rules to permit creditors to realize their fair share in a bankruptcy case without unnecessary
expense.")).
311. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2000).
312. Timber Noteholders' Scotia Brief, supra note 295, at 22-23 (citing 11 U.S.C. §
1129(b) (2000) (requiring similar treatment for similar creditors as a prerequisite for Chapter
11 plan confirmation); In re Bd. of Dirs. of Multicanal, S.A., 314 B.R. 486, 518-19 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Arg. Recovery Co. LLC v. Bd. of Dirs. of
Multicanal S.A., 331 B.R. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("The principle of equality between
identically situated creditors is fundamental under U.S. insolvency law.")).
313. Timber Noteholders' Scotia Brief, supra note 295, at 22 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1109
(granting creditors standing as parties in interest in Chapter 11 cases and giving them the
right to be heard on any issue)). The Timber Noteholders also argued that their due process
protections would be lost if they were sanctioned pursuant to Rule 2019(b). See id. at 22-23;
see also U.S. Const. amend. V (due process of law).
314. Timber Noteholders' Scotia Brief, supra note 295, at 22-23 (citing U.S. Const.
amend. V) (arguing that the rights as secured creditors are "property rights that are protected
by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment"); see also In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148, 158-
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"confidentiality of their proprietary commercial information. ' 3 15 The
putative use of Rule 2019 was particularly troubling to the noteholders.
Similarly, another putative measure feared by the Timber Noteholders
was that Rule 2019 would be used "as a weapon" against ad hoc groups of
security holders to silence security holders who want to participate but do
not want to make onerous disclosures. 3 16 Such attempts to silence security
holders lacked good faith because a debtor cannot use price information to
treat similar creditors differently; all creditors of the same class must be
treated equitably under a Chapter 11 plan, regardless of price. 3 17 Even a
creditor's motivation for enforcing its claim is legally irrelevant in
analyzing Rule 2019. Thus, no inquiries are permitted to determine why
creditors are taking certain positions, so long as they are, in good faith, 3 18
319
seeking to maximize recovery on their claims.
60 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[S]ecurity interests have been recognized as property rights protected by
our Constitution's prohibition against takings without just compensation."). However, not
all securities are secured. See Raviv, supra note 169, at 13-15; Klein, supra note 168, at 505
n. 1.
315. Timber Noteholders' Scotia Brief, supra note 295, at 23 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 107(b))
(arguing that disclosure of confidential information can be compelled in litigation only when
the information is "actually relevant to an issue in dispute").
316. Id. ("[The debtor] understands full well the confidential and highly proprietary
commercial nature of the information it is demanding. What [the debtor] is really seeking to
do is nothing less than to silence the voices of Noteholders .... This is not a good faith
objective, to say the least."); see also LSTA/SIFMA Comment Letter, supra note 34, at 1920 (suggesting that motions for ad hoc groups to comply with Rule 2019 are nothing more
than attempts to deny noteholders statutorily authorized relief).
317. See LSTA/SIFMA Comment Letter, supra note 34, at 22-23; supra note 180 and
accompanying text.
318. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (permitting the designation of votes by creditors who the
court deems are not voting in good faith). Designation of votes disqualifies those
acceptances or rejections from consideration in calculating whether a class of creditors has
accepted or rejected a plan of reorganization. See 7 Resnick & Sommer, supra note 39,
1126.06. For a class to accept the plan, there are two independent requirements. First,
creditors holding at least two-thirds of the total amount of claims in the class must vote to
accept the plan. II U.S.C. § 1126(e). In addition, more than half of the number of creditors
in each class must vote to accept the plan. Id. However, these calculations specifically
exclude creditors whose votes are designated under § 1126(e). Id. This can dramatically
alter whether a class has accepted the plan. Class acceptance is a critical factor in
determining whether a court may approve a plan of reorganization. See id. § 1129(a)(8)(A)
(requiring that each class accept the plan); id. § 1129(a)(10) (requiring at least one class to
accept the plan). A court may confirm a plan despite the rejection of one or more classes,
see id. § 1129(b) (allowing confirmation if all requirements other than satisfaction of §
1129(a)(8) are met and certain other conditions are satisfied), but there must always be at
least one accepting class for a plan to be confirmed, see id. §§ 1129(b), 1129(a)(10). If there
were only one class voting to accept the plan and votes by creditors of that class were
designated under § 1126(e), that could change the calculations of whether that class accepted
the plan. See id. § 1126(c). Such a change would then prevent the court from confirming the
plan.
319. Timber Noteholders' Scotia Brief, supra note 295, at 24; see also In re Adelphia
Commc'ns Corp., 359 B.R. 54, 63 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("To be sure, a culture has
developed in large chapter 11 cases in which many consider it acceptable, and indeed
expected, to use the litigation process as a means to assert or follow through on threats, and
to seek various kinds of relief, to secure 'leverage' in efforts to increase recoveries. I don't
like it .... But aside from saying, in precatory terms, that I don't like such tactics and that
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2. LSTA/SIFMA Position on Rule 2019
The two leading trade organizations of financial securities firms, SIFMA
and LSTA have taken positions in the Rule 2019 debate. Together, they

to
have filed briefs as amici curiae in several cases in which motions 320

compel ad hoc groups to comply strictly with Rule 2019 were pending
and have recently submitted a letter calling for the revision of Rule 2019 to
the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure, and
Evidence, the committee that oversees changes to the federal rules. 32 1 As
representatives of hundreds of institutional investors, 3 22 LSTA and SIFMA
hope to protect their members from disclosure requirements seen by
institutional investors to be damaging to their business models. 3 23 The
trade groups argued that requiring Rule 2019 disclosures by these parties
would discourage "sophisticated financial institutions... from playing
active roles in chapter 11 restructurings, a result antithetical to the goals of
the Bankruptcy Code." 324 This section discusses the various policy reasons
against requiring detailed disclosures from ad hoc groups.

they are a good way to irritate the judge, I don't think that I can or should do anything about
I believe that where, as
them on a motion [to designate pursuant to I1 U.S.C. § 1126(e)] ....
here, creditors are acting to maximize their recoveries, their overly aggressive conduct in the
chapter II process is not a basis for disqualifying their votes."). The Timber Noteholders
acknowledged that "[s]ome have argued that disclosure of holdings can be useful in cases
like Northwest where the debtor's capital structure includes numerous levels for investor
participation, which can lead to conflicting motivations." Timber Noteholders' Scotia Brief,
supra note 295, at 24 n.13. But see Adelphia, 359 B.R. at 64 ("[H]olding long positions in
bonds of various debtors is much more closely akin to ordinary recovery maximization
strategies than it is to the efforts of a business competitor to drive the debtor out of business,
or to harm it in other ways."). The Timber Noteholders' argument that no inquiries are
permitted into creditor positions is not necessarily universally accepted. See id. at 56 ("[A]s a
general matter, there is no absolute rule prohibiting discovery of distressed debt investors'
debt trading activities" but such discovery must be limited "to situations where such
[activity] was sufficiently relevant"). Inquiries into creditors' holdings would be a legitimate
topic of discovery upon "a showing of possibly (but not plainly) improper activities." Id. at
56 n.4.
320. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae the Loan Syndications & Trading Ass'n and the
Securities Industry & Financial Markets Ass'n in Opposition to Wachovia Bank's Motion to
Compel the Informal Committee of Secured Trade Vendors to File a Verified Statement
Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019, In re Musicland Holdings Corp., No. 06-10064 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2007) [hereinafter LSTAISIFMA Musicland Brief].
321. See supra note 34.
322. See Loan Syndication & Trading Ass'n (LSTA), Member Directory,
http://www.lsta.org/LSTAMembers.aspx?id=268 (last visited Feb. 8, 2008); Sec. Ind. & Fin.
Mkts. Ass'n (SIFMA), SIFMA Member Directory, http://www.sifma.org/about/members/
(last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
LSTA and SIFMA
323. LSTAISIFMA Musicland Brief, supra note 320, at 1.
participated as amici in the Rule 2019 litigations on the ground that their collective
memberships are "parties who regularly participate in ad hoc or informal groups of bond and
bank debt holders during the pendency of chapter 11 cases filed by issuers of that debt." Id.
324. Id.
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a. Impact on Secondary Markets
First, LSTA and SIFMA argued that full compliance with Rule 2019,
specifically disclosure of the date of acquisition of claims, "seeks public
disclosure of a market participant's most confidential and proprietary
information: the price at which that institution purchased (and/or sold) its
claims. '32 5
Such pricing information, contemplated long before the
emergence of secondary markets for debt trading, is "wholly irrelevant to
'326
the orderly administration of the case and restructuring of the debtors.
Further, such information is indicative of their underlying business
practices, and requiring such disclosure would give away "trade secret[s]"
to the holder's market competition. 327 Consequently, requiring distressed
debt investors to disclose the date of acquisition of a claim would be
tantamount to requiring disclosure of confidential business secrets, 328 which
would "likely have a dramatic effect on the willingness of financial
institutions to participate in the restructuring process. '3 29 This "exodus"
from the market will lead to serious liquidity problems for distressed

325. Id. at 2.
326. Id.
327. Id. ("[E]ach views its strategy as a trade secret to be held in great confidence, not to
be shared with its competitors. While a participant will disclose that it has joined a member
of an informal group, it will strenuously resist disclosing information concerning its
underlying trades for fear that competitors would then have a window into its unique formula
for success ....).
328. See LSTA/SIFMA Comment Letter, supra note 34, at 23 (discussing investment
strategies of distressed investors). In general, distressed investors
employ aggressive and complex investment strategies that often include a
combination of diversification, leverage, long, short and derivative positions. The
effectiveness of these strategies is dependent on the recognition of trends,
inefficiencies, and valuation of the market that have not been recognized by other
investors. Therefore, public disclosure... could compromise a fund's ability to
execute its own strategy and provide incremental value to its investors .... With
that [public] access, competitors will be better able to reconstruct the unique
trading systems developed by the fund that was forced to disclose.
Id. at 23-24; see also Nicholas F. Kajon, Northwest Rulings May Chill Hedge Fund
Participationin Chapter 11 Cases, Bankruptcy Client Alert (Stevens & Lee PC, New York,
N.Y.),
March
16,
2007,
available
at
http://www.stevenslee.com/news/bankruptcy/NorthwestRuling_0307.pdf.
329. LSTA/SIFMA Musicland Brief, supra note 320, at 3-4. LSTA and SIFMA detail
three main ways in which the absence of these financial institutions will harm
reorganizations. First, "small stakeholders will suffer the absence of a collective larger
economic voice in the case" because it will leave smaller, similarly situated creditors with no
practical, cost-effective way to participate in the expensive process of reorganization. Id. at
4. Second, the "debtor will lose a vital negotiating partner" because the "statutory creditors'
committee... cannot adequately advocate a position on behalf of any one constituency." Id.
In the case where debtors with complex capital structures are unable to negotiate with
official committees because the committees contain a "wide cross-section of creditors," no
one will be able to fill that void. Id. Finally, LSTA and SIFMA argue that the required
disclosure "provides no legitimate benefit" to a reorganization case because the aggregate
holdings of groups will be "sufficient information to understand how loud that group's voice
may loom in the restructuring process." Id. at 5.
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securities of bankrupt companies, harming the original security holder and
330
ultimately making lending to distressed companies less attractive.

b. Meaning of "Committee " in Rule 2019
Next, LSTA and SIFMA argued that these groups of holders, although
calling themselves "ad hoc or informal committees," are not committees but
actually "nothing more than a collection of similarly situated holders of

claims or interests represented by a set of advisors."'33 1 The trade groups
argued that these informal groups of creditors do not satisfy the plain
meaning 332 or legal definition 333 of a committee. They maintained that the
term "committee" refers "only to groups that act in a representative or
334
fiduciary capacity with respect to other creditors or interest holders."

330. See LSTAISIFMA Comment Letter, supra note 34, at 24 (detailing how market
participants often need to sell distressed securities when a company enters bankruptcy or do
not wish to be a part of the bankruptcy and often are able to sell to distressed investors
willing to go through the process). Such an argument seems analogous to a theory of
statutory interpretation used by Judge Shira A. Scheindlin in resolving an appeal interpreting
equitable subordination under section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. See Springfield
Assocs., L.L.C. v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp.), 379 B.R. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Judge
Scheindlin noted that when interpreting a statute, the "plain language" of the statute controls
where it provides a clear answer. Id. at 432. In determining whether the plain meaning of the
statute is ambiguous, though, the court must "tak[e] care that it does not construe any
provision 'in a manner that would place it in conflict with other provisions."' Id. (quoting In
re Smart World Techs., LLC, 423 F.3d 166, 183 (2d Cir. 2005)). Thus, a court "may depart
from the plain language if 'literal application of the statute will produce a result
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of [the statute's] drafters."' Id. (alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)). Judge
Scheindlin concluded that, "in order to ensure that untenable distinctions and unreasonable
results are avoided, it is proper to consider the effect that the Court's interpretation would
have on the markets. The unnecessary breadth of [the lower court's] decisions threatened to
wreak havoc on the markets for distressed debt." Id. at 448.
331. LSTAISIFMA Musicland Brief, supra note 320, at I (arguing that these groups
"give voice to small holders who, acting separately, would have little say in the debtor's
restructuring"). The trade groups argue that these financial institutions "make decisions to
trade claims or interests based on highly confidential and proprietary methods of valuation
analysis" and that those participants "do not engage in a one-time transaction to buy or sell
debt." Id. at 3. "[E]ach implements its respective investment strategy and manages its risk
through a continual evaluation and adjustment to its position in a given credit." Id.
332. Id. at 6 (arguing that a committee is "a body of persons delegated to consider,
investigate, or take action upon and usu[ally] to report concerning some matter of business"
(alteration in original) (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged
458 (Philip Babcock Gove et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002))).
333. Id. (defining a committee as "[a] body of persons who have been selected and
appointed with authority to perform some public service or duty" (quoting Ballentine's Law
Dictionary 225 (3d ed. 1969))).
334. Id. (citing Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Future Asbestos Claim
Representative (In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp.), 327 B.R. 554, 559 (D. Del. 2005)). In
Kaiser, the court held that "[tihe purpose of Rule 2019 is to ensure that plans of
reorganization are negotiated and voted upon by people who are authorized to act on behalf
of the real parties in interest." 327 B.R. at 559 (citations omitted).
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To support this proposition, LSTA and SIFMA cite In re CF Holding
Corp., one of the few cases to have interpreted Rule 2019.335 In CF
Holding, the court noted that "[t]he purpose of Rule 2019 is to further the
Bankruptcy Code's goal of complete disclosure during the business
reorganization process." 336 Towards that end, Rule 2019 is designed "to
cover entities which, during the bankruptcy case, act in a fiduciary capacity
to those they represent, but are not otherwise subject to control of the
court."

3 37

The trade groups further distinguished the activities of the informal
groups from more structured entities that act on behalf of their or others'
They claimed there is no agreement binding
collective interests.
participants together, minority positions on issues are not negated by
338
majority positions, and membership in any particular group is fluid.
Rather than any formal committee, they argued, these groups are just a
"'bunch of creditors."' 339 In fact, these creditors do not act as fiduciaries to
each other since "[e]ach seeks only to do what is best in its individual
economic interest at that particular time." 340 Their interactions with each
other do not suggest that any member can bind other members of the group
or act on behalf of other creditors outside of the group. 34 1 Since these
groups do not act as fiduciaries to each other or to similarly situated
because the rule
creditors as a whole, Rule 2019 does not apply to them
34 2
refers only to committees that act in a fiduciary capacity.

335. LSTA/SIFMA Musicland Brief, supra note 320, at 6-7.
336. In re CF Holding Corp., 145 B.R. 124, 126 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1992). Complete
disclosure allows the court to police activities of those who acquire claims and interests at
distressed or default prices. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text. However,
LSTA and SIFMA argued that such information is often irrelevant because the Bankruptcy
Code does not treat creditors who acquire claims differently based upon the price they paid
for those claims. See LSTA/SIFMA Comment Letter, supra note 34, at 10. However, there
are some situations in which pricing information may be required, and such disclosure is
more readily available through discovery. Id. at 10-12 (citing rare motions to designate an
entity's acceptance or rejection of a plan pursuant to § 1126(e) and an inquiry into good faith
of a plan proponent under § 1129(a)(3) as two examples of the Code's use of subjective
intent in Chapter 11 cases); see also In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 359 B.R. 54, 56 & n.4
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
337. LSTA/SIFMA Musicland Brief, supra note 320, at 6-7 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (admitting, however, that the parties agreed that the rule applies to attorneys who
represent more than one creditor or equity security holder).
338. See id. at 7.
339. Id. (quoting Scotia, Apr. 17, 2007, Hearing Transcript, supra note 36, at 4-5 (Judge
Richard Schmidt)). The purpose of these informal groups acting together is to enable
lockstep negotiation towards a "global solution"; and to "maximize efficiencies and
minimize costs" by engaging a single law firm. Id. at 8.
340. Id. at 8.
341. Id. (noting that parties may drop out at any time, group members holding dissenting
views are free to take action on their own or even oppose group efforts, and above all "[t]hey
act only for their own benefit, and seek to advance only their own economic interests").
342. See id. at 11 (declaring that "the disclosure requirements of Rule 2019-just like that
of its predecessors-are intended to prevent abuses by 'committee' members whose
supposed function is to 'protect' other stakeholders as their fiduciary").
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c. Failureof Rule 2019 and Its Underinclusive Effect
Finally, LSTA and SIFMA argued that, if the goals of Rule 2019 "were
truly important to bankruptcy reorganizations," then the Rule is actually
underinclusive. 34 3 Rule 2019 only requires disclosures related to claim or
stock acquisition from committees and groups that hire a single attorney to
represent their interests, and not to investors who are not members of ad
hoc groups but who may be seeking to profit from buying debt or equity at
distressed prices. 344 In essence, Rule 2019 penalizes collective action by
making it less likely that debt and equity holders with common interests
will work together, a goal that is inconsistent with the Rules Enabling Act
and the Bankruptcy Rules. 345 As a result, LSTA and SIFMA have
developed a set of recommendations for revising Rule 2019 to make it more
practical in current Chapter 11 cases.
d. LSTA and SIFMA's Recommendations
In their letter seeking revisions to Rule 2019, LSTA and SIFMA argued
that Rule 2019 is seriously outdated and requires revision, proposing that
discovery of distressed acquisitions more fully comport with the goals of
the Bankruptcy Code by focusing parties on disclosures that are more
relevant to the goals of maintaining open and honest reorganizations and
establishing the true economic interests at stake in a case. 34 6 Discovery
allows disclosure of relevant information only to those parties who need
that information, thus removing business disclosures from the public

343. See LSTA/SIFMA Comment Letter, supra note 34, at 15.
344. Id. at 15, 17 (arguing that "if transparency truly allows the court and the debtor to
'root out' investors who act in bad faith . . . then the Rule should apply equally to all
participants in a bankruptcy case"). As LSTA and SIFMA pointed out, individual creditors
are capable of abusing the reorganization system just as much as groups. See id. at 17 (citing
In re Papercraft Corp., 187 B.R. 486 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1995), rev'd and remanded,211 B.R.
813 (W.D. Pa. 1997), affd and remanded, 160 F.3d 982 (3d Cir. 1998), on remand, 247
B.R. 625, 629-30 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2000)). Such abuse is achieved through Rule 3001(e),
which governs the buying and selling of claims in bankruptcy and does not require that
purchasers disclose the purchase price. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(e). See generally
Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 180, at 21. Interestingly, Rule 3001(e) specifically exempts
from regulations claims based on "a bond or debenture," which seems to encourage "public
markets in debt securities to function during a bankruptcy case without interference by the
bankruptcy court." See id. at 21.
345. See LSTA/SIFMA Comment Letter, supra note 34, at 22 (arguing that Rule 2019
conflicts with the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every case and
proceeding" demanded by Rule 1001 and the "policies embodied in the [Bankruptcy]
Code-the most important of which is to solve complex business problems through
collective action, negotiation, and compromise" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
346. See id. at 12 ("Traditional discovery... is limited to what is relevant. By requiring
relevance, the Federal Rules ensure that the time and expense of disclosure about one's
business is not imposed pointlessly. Rule 2019 does not afford claim holders even the
minimal protection of the relevance standard."); cf supra notes 285, 288-90 and
accompanying text.

2614

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76

dockets. 34 7 Thus, discovery is a "reasonable and appropriate substitute" for
public disclosures under Rule 2019.348 Such a change would also protect
market participants from public disclosure on their individual transactions,
a requirement necessary to keep investors in the distressed securities
market, 349 while debtors have other public means of finding out general
information on the trading prices of their securities. 350 Finally, as an
alternative to disclosure through discovery, LSTA and SIFMA argued that
in camera review may be a plausible "middle ground" between mandatory
35 1
public disclosure and complete confidentiality.
The Northwest decision holding that ad hoc groups are committees under
Rule 2019 is at odds with the Scotia ruling that the groups are just bunches
of creditors. Because each interpretation requires a different level of detail
in Rule 2019 disclosures, institutional investors, in particular, are in need of
a resolution of this debate. Although the Northwest court provides
incredibly strong policy reasons for its interpretation of Rule 2019, Part III
argues that ad hoc groups are not committees under Rule 2019 because the
drafters of the Rule's predecessor statute would not have considered them
committees under equity receiverships or Chapter X.

347. LSTA/SIFMA Comment Letter, supra note 34, at 12-13 ("[D]ata produced in
discovery are not automatically placed in the public docket for the world to view over the
Internet. Conversely, Rule 2019 requires the publication of such data in a filing which is
then posted on the court's electronic docket.").
348. Id. at 13.
349. Id. at 22-23 (discussing the sophistication of investors and the likely outcome of
lowered participation by institutional investors).
350. Id. at 14. According to LSTA and SIFMA,
[T]he debtor's financial personnel or outside financial advisors can (and do)
contact trading desks and market makers who routinely make markets in distressed
debt. Even easier, numerous print publications and electronic services like
Bloomberg report daily on the prices being quoted for distressed debt, just as the
Wall Street Journal publishes quotes for instruments being traded in other capital
markets.... Through those sources, the debtor can easily determine the price at
which its debt may be trading on any given trading day, including past trading
days. Because that market is sufficiently well developed and its quotations are
readily accessible, the debtor is in a position to evaluate the prices being paid for
its debt generally without need for Rule 2019.
Id.
351. Id. at 25-26. This approach, they argued, comports with the viewpoint expressed by
Judge Judith K. Fitzgerald in the various asbestos cases pending in U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Delaware, in which those required to disclose under Rule 2019 were
allowed to do so under seal to avoid violating holders' confidentiality. Id. at 26 (citing
Owens Corning,Oct. 6, 2004, Hearing Transcript, supra note 228, at 55). Judge Fitzgerald
had previously issued an order setting forth Rule 2019 disclosure requirements in asbestosrelated Chapter 11 cases, but permitting such disclosures to be filed under seal with the clerk
of the court. See Amendatory Order Requiring Filing of Statements Pursuant to Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 2019, In re Owens Coming, No. 00-03837 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 27, 2004); see
also supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
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III. THE CURRENT STATE OF AD HOC GROUP PARTICIPATION:
AD HOC GROUPS AS CREDITORS AND
THE NECESSARY COMPROMISES AND SOLUTIONS
Deciding whether ad hoc groups are committees under Rule 2019 is an
important question in corporate reorganization law today. The history of
Rule 2019 and the Bankruptcy Code require bankruptcy courts to adopt the
Scotia rule that ad hoc groups are not committees under Rule 2019.
However, given the drastic changes in the market, even since the adoption
of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, the fundamental policies on disclosure of
the full economic interests at play underscored by Judge Gropper in
Northwest are even more meaningful today. Given the significant changes
in institutional investing since disclosure was first required in the 1930s,
with the rise of hedge fund activity and the increasing complexity of
debtors' capital structures, Rule 2019 should be reevaluated in order to
ensure that the disclosures it requires adequately advise parties of the true
economic interests represented. Hence, LSTA and SIFMA's request to
revise the rule is critical to Chapter 11 reorganizations. In particular, this
Note advocates additional disclosures related to creditors' holdings across
capital structures to advise the parties of the full extent of the economic
interests at play. However, this information should be presented in a way
that strictly comports with the language of Rule 2019, focusing on the time
of acquisition rather than on identifying specific dates of acquisition. Such
an interpretation achieves a compromise that should be acceptable to all
those involved in Chapter 11 practice.
A. HistoricalMeaning of "Committee " in Rule 2019: The Improper
ClassificationofAd Hoc Groups as Committees
Classification of ad hoc groups of institutional investors as committees is
inconsistent with the plain, 35 2 legal,3 5 3 and historical definitions of a
committee. Rule 2019 undoubtedly has its roots in the SEC's response to
its exhaustive study of protective and reorganization committees in equity
354
receiverships and bankruptcy cases under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
Reference to this study of protective committees highlights the fundamental
differences between protective committees and modem ad hoc investor
groups.
Protective committees were representative. 355 Their members were held
to the highest duties of loyalty and care. 356 The protective committees
spoke for creditors who did not get involved in the cases, primarily because
they actually deposited the securities with the committee. 357 These
352. See supra notes 295, 297-98, 332 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 295-96, 333 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 59, 113, 187 and accompanying text.

355. See supra notes 137, 145-48 and accompanying text.
356. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
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committees were expected to look out for those they represented, and
individual security holders could rely on this, since protective committees
largely drove the reorganization process. 3 58 In equity receiverships,
protective committees had significant control of the reorganization, 359 a
360
crucial factor to the SEC.
Modem ad hoc creditor and equity holder groups are much different,
primarily because the Chapter 11 process is radically different than equity
receivership or Chapter X.3 6 1 Control of the reorganization process, which
was under the exclusive dominion of protective committees in equity
receiverships, is now largely vested with the debtor in possession. 362 The
fiduciary and representative responsibilities of the protective committees in
equity receiverships now lie with the official committees appointed
pursuant to section 1102.363 Security holders now are nothing more than
individual creditors, a far cry from the controlling and representative
36 4
entities they once were.
However, the Bankruptcy Code does not require individual creditors
simply to let others dictate their recoveries. 365 Rather, the Bankruptcy
Code explicitly gives every creditor or equity holder the right to be heard on
all matters, 366 a right that originated in the SEC report. 3 67 Often, individual
creditors may not appear because official committees are appointed to
represent their interests. 36 8 In addition, creditors wishing to be involved
may not want to be subject to the fiduciary requirements imposed upon
members of official committees. 369 Thus, individual security holders can
and do appear and participate in Chapter 11 cases because it is the best way
to vindicate their claims.
However, sometimes it is more practical for several security holders to
group together and hire one law firm to represent them. Although highly
sophisticated, institutional investors 370 use ad hoc groups to vindicate their
legally valid claims, which are entitled to be treated the same as those
358. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 49, 134, 139 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text. What was troubling, though, was
that often these protective committees had little at stake, and their voices were heard over the
voices of those security holders whose financial interests were directly at issue in the
reorganizations. Hence disclosure was a check against this particular abuse. See supra notes
93-94 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 118-40 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 149-57 and accompanying text.
364. Importantly, protective committees did not have standing to appear in cases but had
to request to intervene. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text. Each of the security
holders in an ad hoc group does have standing as a result of his or her status as creditor. See
11 U.S.C. § 1109 (2000).
365. See supra note 162.
366. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 23, 179-81 and accompanying text.
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claims held by similarly situated creditors. 37 1 Such a practice seems like it
fully supports the Bankruptcy Rules' emphasis on efficiency and
practicality in the resolution of disputes. 372 Thus, the best interpretation of
Rule 2019 is one that recognizes this practical advantage, which is exactly
what Judge Schmidt did in ruling that the noteholder group in Scotia was
3 73
just "a bunch of creditors."
Finally, the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code reflected a clear
understanding by Congress that the investors who needed protection were
those holding subordinated debt and equity. 374 Indeed, the troubling aspect
of citing this fact is that the lamb has become the lion; while, previously,
the public held these securities, now these public investors, those who buy
and sell on the public markets, are sophisticated institutional investors.
That undoubtedly is what troubles many promoting the Northwest
interpretation of Rule 2019. In fact, it is probably a good reason for
Congress to look at this rule. 375 However, until a new rule is made, Rule
2019 is the rule governing ad hoc groups, and the term "committee" must
be interpreted narrowly.
Consequently, one key weakness of the Northwest decision is that there
is no consensual agency relationship between the committee members and
nonmember security holders. The assertion that Rule 2019 "gives other
members of the class the right to know where their champions are coming
from" 376 misses the point. Ad hoc groups are not representatives or
fiduciaries to nonmembers. 377
Unlike protective committees, where
individual security holders could expect (and even demand) loyalty and care
from those on committees, the individual security holder has no basis for
expecting ad hoc groups to represent his or her interest.3 78 The prior cases
371. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
372. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 293-94 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
375. See Berman & Brighton, supra note 185, at 65 ("Perhaps it is even a wake-up call
that many of the tools of the bankruptcy process need to be re-evaluated by the courts and
Congress in light of the economic reality of the current dynamic marketplace, where the debt
and equity of reorganizing companies are constantly being traded .... ").
376. In re Northwest Airlines Corp. (Northwest I1), 363 B.R. 704, 709 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2007); see also supra note 287 and accompanying text.
377. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
378. It is the official committee who the individual security holder, just like any other
creditor, must expect to be his "champion." See supra notes 152-54, 158 and accompanying
text; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(5) (2000) (stating that committees act for those they
represent); 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (detailing the appointment process for official committees).
Similarly, Judge Gropper's concern that members of an ad hoc group will sell and leave a
group without a representative is also misplaced. In theory, the abandonment of litigation by
an ad hoc creditor group does not leave individual security holders without representationtheir representation is the official committee. See id. (mandating the appointment of a
creditors' committee as soon as practicable). For equity holders, in the event that no official
committee exists, just as no official equity committee existed in Northwest, the U.S. trustee's
decision not to appoint an equity committee and the court's refusal to appoint one mean that
representation is inappropriate. See 11 U.S.C. § 1 102(a)(l)-(2). Individual equity security
holders are not given the right to representation in Chapter 11 cases, primarily because many
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interpreting Rule 2019379 all relied on the notion that Rule 2019 properly
applied to those entities who were engaged in a consensual agency
relationship. 380 Agency requires two manifestations of consent: the agent's
consent to represent the interest of the principal, and the principal's consent
that the agent represent his interest.381 While Judge Gropper is absolutely
correct that many passive security holders will rely on an ad hoc group to
take positions on its behalf, the ad hoc groups do not agree to represent the
interests of nonmember security holders.
Hence, a basic agency
relationship does not exist.
Because ad hoc groups of security holders are not committees within the
meaning of Rule 2019, the Rule's more detailed disclosure requirements do
not apply to them. Instead, the only disclosures required for these groups
are those required under Rule 2019(a)(2). The plain meaning of the Rule
2019 references any entity representing more than one creditor or equity
security holder, 382 and courts have traditionally interpreted "entity" to
include lawyers and law firms. 3 8 3 Consequently, attorneys must file
statements under Rule 2019 to disclose the "nature and amount" of their
clients' claims or equity interests and the "time of acquisition thereof. ' 384
Part III.B more clearly articulates the required disclosures under Rule
2019(a)(2) for ad hoc groups.
B. Renewed Policy Emphasis: Attainment of Judge Gropper'sPolicy
Goals and EnsuredParticipationof InstitutionalInvestors
Requiring strict compliance with Rule 2019(a)(2) is an important means
of achieving the policy goals articulated by the SEC report and echoed in
Northwest that reorganizations should be open and honest and all parties be
advised of the true economic interests at stake. Hence, with respect to ad
hoc groups of security holders, Rule 2019 ought to be strictly enforced, not
merely left to the discretion of the court. Unlike those cases in which
public access to the information would be damaging, informing the other
parties in interest of the nature and amount of claims held and the times
when acquired is the first step towards successful resolution of disputes.
Judge Gropper's citations to the SEC report in his opinions in
Northwest385 underline the policy goals that disclosure achieves. The
abuses recognized by the SEC were real. The reorganization process under
equity receiverships allowed misuse and abuse, whether through the use of
cases do not yield recoveries for equity holders. The only right given to equity holders
individually is the right to appear and be heard. See 11 U.S.C. § 1109.
379. See supra Part I.C.2.
380. See supra notes 207-25 and accompanying text.
381. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
382. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019(a).
383. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
384. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019(a)(2).
385. In re Northwest Airlines Corp. (Northwest 1), 363 B.R. 701, 704 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2007); In re Northwest Airlines Corp. (Northwest II), 363 B.R. 704, 707-08 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2007); see supra notes 271-72, 285 and accompanying text.
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irrevocable proxies, through the organization of protective committees by
corporate management and its bankers, or through the creation of protective
committees whose members were not actual investors but rather were
merely seeking to take advantage of the monetary gains possible for those
who participate in reorganizations. 386 In addition, the SEC seriously
condemned the practice of buying debentures or stock of reorganizing
The SEC's
companies at distressed or defaulted prices. 387
recommendations were designed to prevent these abuses and achieve a
388
discrete set of policy goals.
Namely, reorganizations needed to be in the control of bona fide security
389
holders who wanted the right to be heard in all matters before the court.
In addition, their representatives, those on protective committees, needed to
be reminded that they occupied a fiduciary position and were prohibited
from serving competing interests in the reorganization process. 390 Finally,
steps needed to be taken to curb abuse of the reorganization process,
including the prohibition of deposit agreements, the removal of
management and bankers from controlling essential bondholder lists, the
exclusion of those seeking to hijack the reorganization process for personal
and nondisclosure in
profit, and the elimination of misrepresentation
39 1
solicitation of votes for reorganization plans.
It is within this framework that the Chandler Act was designed to place
reorganizations more squarely under the oversight and review of the
39 2
Each portion of the rules of practice enacted as part of the
courts.
Chandler Act derive from the SEC's report: Requiring disclosure of
committee membership holdings ensured the goal of allowing participation
only to bona fide investors. Filing the instrument authorizing agency
allowed the court to monitor potential uses of proxy deposit agreements.
Disclosure by attorneys or committees that represent multiple creditors was
designed to ensure that the represented parties were actually parties in
interest, who were given a statutory right to appear and be heard. And
disclosure of the time of acquisition of claims was designed to weed out
by
those who participated in the reorganization process in bad faith
393
acquiring claims and equity interests at distressed and default prices.
Disclosure of some sort is a necessary part of the Chapter 11 process. In
modern bankruptcy, where the goals are to facilitate negotiation and
compromise, it is crucial to know who the negotiating parties are-who is
at the table. 394 The intercreditor issues in Adelphia were eventually settled,

386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 97-100, 107-08 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.3.a.iii.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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and not litigated to completion, because the parties were
able to know each
39 5
other's positions and financial stakes in the bankruptcy.
But for Chapter 11 to work, parties must actually come to the table.
Distressed investors, who largely make up the debt and equity holders
involved in bankruptcies, 3 96 have said that requiring detailed disclosures
will force them out of the bankruptcy process. 397 Hence, an interpretation
of Rule 2019 that keeps distressed investors in the game while still allowing
parties to know who the key players are (and who they are not) is required.
Disclosure under Rule 2019(a)(2) is a helpful first step in advising
the
398
parties of the economic interests truly at stake in the reorganization.
However, what is to be disclosed remains a crucial issue to investor
participation. Investors are concerned that Rule 2019 may be used as a
395. See In re Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., 368 B.R. 140, 238-44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(discussing the standards for approving settlements and concluding that settlement was in the
best interest of the parties given the range of likely litigation outcomes).
396. See supra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 325-30 and accompanying text. In interpreting Rule 2019, then,
care must be taken to read the rule in a way that least affects the market, much like Judge
Scheindlin did by interpreting a section of the Bankruptcy Code with the effect that the
court's interpretation would have on the secondary distressed debt markets in mind. See
supra note 330; see also Springfield Assocs., L.L.C. v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp.), 379
B.R. 425, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). In enacting the Bankruptcy Code, Congress recognized that
bankruptcy law had to change with the times and work with market conditions, not against
them. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text. Thus, any interpretation that
discourages participation in bankruptcy by bona fide creditors cannot be consistent with the
aims of the Bankruptcy Code. Nor is it even consistent with the goals of the SEC report,
which placed participation by bona fide creditors at the top of the list of reform policies. See
supra note 89 and accompanying text.
398. Disclosing the amount of claims held gives an idea of the financial stake at issue.
However, disclosure of the "time of acquisition" is a perplexing problem. The SEC report
and the Chandler Act were designed explicitly to curb what the SEC called "bad faith"
purchases of debt and equity interests at distressed and default prices. The real conflict with
respect to this phrase is that the Rule fails to take into account the current market practices of
buying and selling distressed debt. As LSTA and SIFMA note, in today's bankruptcy cases,
"the buying and selling of distressed claims is the rule rather than the exception, particularly
with respect to large public debtors." LSTA/SIFMA Comment Letter, supra note 34, at 17.
In the 1920s and '30s, there was not a large secondary market for distressed debt and equity,
and the fears addressed by the provisions were that insiders and their selected committees
would take advantage of smaller security holders by securing their proxies. See supra notes
134-39 and accompanying text. Increasingly, the liquidity provided by distressed investors
has helped troubled companies. See supra notes 166, 175, 325-30 and accompanying text.
The secondary market participants for corporate debt largely demand confidentiality of
information, while the Rule demands public disclosure of times of acquisition because of the
SEC's stated policy of deterring the buying of debt or equity at distressed and defaulted
prices. The Timber Noteholders' arguments that they are entitled to secrecy in their
investments therefore seem contrary to the stated public policy of the Rule, which requires
disclosure of the time of acquisition. If the debt or equity was acquired more than one year
before the date of the debtor's filing of the Chapter 11 petition, though, no disclosures need
to be made. This distinction reflects the SEC's policy of deterring what modem financiers
would term "vulture funds." See generally The Vultures Take Wing, supra note 37.
However, the Bankruptcy Rules seem to encourage the continued trading of securities
postpetition. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(e); Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 180, at 21; supra
note 344. Therefore, in a battle of policies, it seems only logical that the current Bankruptcy
Rules, which consider the secondary markets, should control.
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means to silence security holders who do not wish to disclose what they
consider confidential business secrets. 39 9 To keep them involved, what
disclosures will and will not be required for ad hoc groups to participate
must be set forth explicitly and definitively. Thus, disclosure must be
mandatory and not subject merely to the discretion of the court as proposed
40 0
by Rapisardi.
In order to keep investors involved, Rule 2019 ought to be read to permit
disclosures that interpret the time of acquisition provision of Rule
2019(a)(2) to require less exact details than disclosure of the date of
acquisition as required in Northwest. Perhaps the best compromise between
these numerous and conflicting considerations is to interpret the time of
acquisition provision of Rule 2019(a)(2) narrowly. Phrases such as "more
than one year before the petition date," "within one year before the petition
date," or "postpetition" convey a surprising amount of information while
still not giving away full details and satisfy the time requirement of Rule
2019.401 As these securities are often publicly traded on open secondary
markets, records are kept showing the prices at which they traded. This
allows disclosure of a range of values-enough to give the court and the
players in the case a sense of whether or not the bad faith feared by the SEC
exists, but enough protection to shield individual investors' exact series of
transactions. This compromise would advise all parties of the different
economic interests at stake and appease hedge funds' concerns about
disclosing what they consider to be confidential business information. It
allows parties to know who is at the table while ensuring that hedge funds
will still come to the table in the first place. This seems a more practical
compromise than the in camera review advocated by LSTA and SIFMA,
which would fail to give any other party in interest the inclination that bad
faith might exist. If exact acquisition prices need to be made known to the
court, though, the more detailed information can be obtained through
discovery or in camera review.
C. Cross Structure Holding Disclosures:
Important Expansions of Rule 2019's Reach
Disclosure of the nature and acquisition of the claims represented and the
time of acquisition thereof fails to advise adequately the parties in interest
399. See supra Part II.B. 1.c.
400. See supra Part II.A.3.

401. "Time" is defined as, among other things, "a period designated for a given activity"
or a "period necessary or available for a given activity." American Heritage Dictionary of
the English Language (Joseph P. Pickett et al. eds., 4th ed. 2004). It appears that some have
confused the "time of acquisition" required under Rule 2019(a)(2) with requiring a date of
acquisition. Such disclosure is clearly excluded from the Rule. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019.
In addition, the SEC was concerned with those who bought securities at depressed prices
immediately before or during a reorganization. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying
text. This proposed definition of the "time of acquisition" requirement of Rule 2019
adequately provides the relevant information to evaluate whether security holders are
involved with the practices that gave rise to such a disclosure requirement.
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of the full extent of the economic interests at stake because this does not
include disclosure of any holdings held in other parts of the debtor's capital
structure. In Adelphia and Northwest, one major issue in both cases was the
cross-structure holdings of the investors involved in ad hoc groups because
these cross-structure holdings were believed to influence the positions taken
by the parties. 40 2 Yet, as noted at one of many hearings in Adelphia, Rule
2019 does not address the issue of short selling positions across a capital
structure. 40 3 In fact, in response to a comment by counsel that the Rule
2019 statements failed to give an adequate picture of the economic interests
at stake, Judge Robert E. Gerber asked, "Do you think there's noncompliance with 2019, or do you think there's a flaw in 2019 that it doesn't
require disclosure of enough different kinds of things?" 40 4 Clearly, there is
a distinct economic interest at play when an investor takes a short position
in another area of the capital structure. 40 5 Such an economic interest is not
disclosed under Rule 2019's current requirements that nature, amount, and
date of acquisition of claims be disclosed because an attorney filing a
statement pursuant to Rule 2019 only represents the client with respect to
the holding that is common to all members of the ad hoc group. 406 The
necessity of this additional disclosure is due largely to the fact that the
companies filing for Chapter II protection, like Adelphia and Northwest,
have incredibly complex and sophisticated corporate and capital
structures. 40 7 It also appears that this was a major motivating factor behind
the Northwest decision.4 08 Consequently, LSTA and SIFMA's proposed
402. See supra notes 245-49, 290 and accompanying text.
403. See Adelphia, Oct. 30, 2006, Hearing Transcript, supra note 245, at 8-10.
404. Id. at 8.
405. See id. at 9 (arguing that an "additional ulterior... purpose of enhancing the short
position of making a profit" would be critical to the issue of designation of votes cast for
being in bad faith); supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
406. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2019.
407. See Roundtable, supra note 246, at 14 (interviewing Kenneth A. Buckfire, cofounder
of Miller Buckfire, who discussed the "complex capital structures" of companies that he
predicts will be in the next "cycle" of Chapter 11 filings); Shearer, supra note 185, at 38
(saying that "the increased complexity of companies' capital structure" will have a marked
impact on workouts for distressed companies); supra notes 319-20.
408. See supra note 290. It is therefore understandable that Judge Gropper wanted to
require disclosure of this information, couching it in terms of a "plain meaning" argument.
However, the rationale that "[m]uch has changed in reorganization practice since the
1930[s], but the disclosure required by what is now Bankruptcy Rule 2019 is substantially
the same," In re Northwest Airlines Corp. (Northwest I1), 363 B.R. 704, 708 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2007), ignores the fundamental change in policy enacted in the Bankruptcy Code.
In fact, the Bankruptcy Code was enacted precisely because the securities markets had
radically changed since the 1930s. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text. Further,
the SEC's suggestions were designed to protect bona fide security holders from non-security
holders, not necessarily to protect security holders from each other. See supra notes 93-94,
286-87 (discussing the need to protect non-group members from ad hoc group positions).
Nevertheless, his initial inclination is right-competing economic interests will definitely
influence positions taken on issues in a bankruptcy case. See supra note 290; see also
Berman & Brighton, supra note 185, at 64-65 (detailing how cross-structure holdings affect
positions taken on issues and identifying such changes in position as one of the greatest
threats to the Chapter 11 process).
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revisions to Rule 2019 should be taken up by the Judicial Cohference
Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure, and Evidence, 40 9 who should
consider enhancing Rule 2019 to require disclosure of cross-structure
holdings.
CONCLUSION

Ad hoc groups of institutional investors are not committees under Rule
2019. Therefore, Rule 2019(a)(4) does not apply to their members.
However, Rule 2019(a)(2) still requires disclosure of the nature and amount
of their claims or interests, and the times when acquired. The times when
acquired can be adequately disclosed simply by disclosing whether debt or
equity was acquired more than a year before the petition, prepetition, or
postpetition. This solution protects the trading secrets of institutional
investors while still giving debtors, the court, the U.S. trustee, and official
committees information on the economic interests at stake in a
reorganization. However, the significant changes in the credit markets,
where distressed debt is easily traded, and the increasing complexity of
corporate capital structures allowing cross-structure holdings require an
addition to Rule 2019 that advises the court of any holdings beyond the
particular debt or equity position represented by the ad hoc group. These
compromises will ensure that all parties in a reorganization will know
exactly who is at the table.

409. See supra Part II.B.2.d.
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